UC-NRLF 


06 


$B    lb    OtS 


^ 


■  REESE  LIBRARY  ■ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 
^icessioiis  No.  SP'^'Vi.     C/js.s'  No. 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/drillregulationsOOordwrich 


DRILL  REGULATIONS 


FOR 


STREET  RIOT  DUTY, 


INCIvUDING   IvECTURE   ON 

RELATIONS    BETWEEN    MILITARY    AND    CIVIL  ^ 

AUTHORITY;    RIGHTS    AND    DUTIES 

OF  MILITARY  OFFICERS;  AND 

METHODS  OF  DEALING 

WITH  RIOTS. 


BRIGADIER  GENERAL  ALBERT  ORDWAY, 

District  of  Columbia  Militia. 


J  ARMIES    .T.    CH:A.T»M:^IS-,    FulDlislier, 

916  PENNSYLVANIA  AVENUE,  • 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


JuDD  &  Detwe:iIvER,  Printers. 


COPYRIGHTED    1891. 


G9S 


DRILL    REGULATIONS 

FOR 

STREET-RIOT  DUTY. 


1.  The  movements  herein  described  for  a  battalion  of  four 
companies  may  be  readily  applied  to  a  battalion  of  any  number 
of  companies, 

IN  the;  armory. 

2.  Not  less  than  sixteen  sharpshooters  will  be  selected  and 
placed  under  the  command  of  the  battalion  Inspector  of  Small 
Arms  Firing,  who  will  post  them  in  equal  numbers  in  the  line 
of  file-closers  of  each  company.  These  sharpshooters  should 
be  designated  by  a  handkerchief  tied  around  their  left  arm,  or 
b}'  any  other  device  by  which  they  may  be  readily  distinguished. 

Non-combatant  staff  officers,  colors  and  color  guard,  musi- 
cians, uninstructed  recruits,  convalescents,  and  a  suitable  detail 
for  guard  duty,  will  l>e  designated  to  remain  in  the  armory. 

Companies  will  be  equalized. 

3.  If  a  crowd  is  assembled  in  front  of  the  armory  the  com- 
manding officer  will  adopt  such  methods  of  egress  as  the  situa- 
tion of  the  armor}^  and  the  disposition  of  the  crowd  may  indicate 
as  best.  As  a  general  rule,  if  the  crowd  is  not  aggressively 
hostile,  the  front  and  rear  subdivisions  of  the  battalion  should 
move  out  from  the  arnior}^  door  in  parallel  columns  of  twos  or 
fours  and  force  their  way  through  the  crowd  to  the  opposite 
side  of  the  street ;  then,  facing  in  opposite  directions,  force  the 
crowd  back  until  space  is  made  for  the  next  interior  subdivision 
to  march  out  in  the  same  wa}-,  and  so  on  until  the  whole  bat- 
talion is  formed  in  column  in  the  street.  If  the  crowd  is  hostile 
and  attempts  to  prevent  the  egress  of  the  troops,  proper  and 
extreme  offensive  measures  should  be  resorted  to  at  once. 


IN  Tun  STREKT. 

4.  The  posts  assigned  to  field  aud  staff  officers  in  ordinary 
drill  manoeuvres  being  impracticable  in  street  parades,  and  in- 
admissible when  on  street-riot  duty,  will  be  modified  as  follows  : 

In  line,  the  major,  adjutant,  and  sergeant-major  will  post 
themselves  at  so  much  less  than  their  prescribed  distances  as  the 
width  of  the  street  may  indicate  as  proper ;  or,  if  necessary, 
may  even  retain  positions  corresponding  to  those  assigned  to 
them  in  column. 

Tn  column,  the  major  will  take  post  at  the  head  of  the 
column  ;  the  adjutant  on  the  right  of  the  commissioned  staff; 
and  the  sergeant-major  on  the  right  of  the  non-commissioned 
staff. 

In  columns  of  platoons,  if  the  width  of  the  street  does  not 
permit  captains  to  take  post  th^-ee  paces  from  the  flank  of  the 
column,  they  will  take  such  less  distance  as  may  be  necessary. 

When  a  battalion  on  street-riot  duty  marches  in  column  of 
companies  or  platoons,  it  wdll  invariably  form  in  "  street- 
column  "  order,  no  matter  how  remote  it  may  be  from  the  scene 
of  riot  or  apprehended  danger. 

TO   FORM  STREET  COI^UMN   OF  COMPANIES   OR   PI^ATOONS. 

5.  Being  in  line,  or  in  columns  of  fours,  the  battalion  will  be 
formed  into  column  of  companies,  or  column  of  platoons,  by 
the  same  commands  as  prescribed  in  the  SCHOOi^  OF  THE 
BatTai^ion,  except  that  they  will  be  prefixed  by  the  command 
J^orm  street  column  ■;  and  the  movement  will  be  executed  in 
the  same  manner,  except  that  the  sharpshooters  in  the  line 
of  file-closers  will  pass  around  the  flanks  of  their  respective 
subdivisions  and  take  post  three  paces  from  the  flanks  of 
the  column,  the  leading  sharpshooter  of  each  flank  on  a  line 
with  the  major,  the  rear  sharpshooter  of  each  flank  on  a  line 
with  the  non-commissioned  staff,  and  the  others  at  equal  in- 
tervals from  front  to  rear. 

Being  in  street  column  of  companies  or  platoons,  to  form  line 
or  column  of  fours. 

6.  The  movements  will  be  executed  by  the  same  commands 
and  in  the  same  manner  as  prescribed  in  the  ScHOOi^  OF  THE 
BatTaIvION,  except  that  the  sharpshooters  will  resume  their 
posts  in  the  line  of  file-closers. 


7-  Oil  approachiug  the  scene  of  riot,  or  on  the  first  symptoms 
of  danger,  and  in  marching  through  the  streets  during  a  general 
riot  or  uprising,  troops  will  be  moved  habitually  in  the  forma- 
tion of  ' '  street  square. ' ' 

TO   FORM  STREET  SQUARE. 

From  a  street  column  of  companies  at  full  distance. 

8.  Being  at  a  halt,  the  major  commands  : 

I.  Form  street  square,  2.  March. 

At  the  first  command,  the  captain  of  the  first  company  cau- 
tions it  to  stand  fast.  ^ 
The  captain  of  the  second  company  commands  : 
1.  Right  forward,  2.   Twos  right. 

The  captain  of  the  third  company  commands  : 
I.  Left  forward,  2.   Twos  left. 

The  captain  of  the  fourth  company  commands  : 
I.  Forward. 

At  the  command  march,  which  is  repeated  by  the  captains  of 
second,  third  and  fourth  companies,  the  major  and  staff  and  the 
captain  of  the  first  company  will  pass  around  the  flanks  of  that 
company  and  take  post  in  the  rear  of  it ;  the  non-commissioned 
staff  and  the  file-closers  of  the  fourth  company  will  pass  around 
the  flanks  of  that  company  and  take  post  in  front  of  it ;  the 
file-closers  of  the  second  and  third  companies  will  pass  around 
the  rear  of  their  companies  and  take  post  on  their  inner  flanks. 
The  captain  of  the  second  and  third  companies  will  halt  their 
companies  two  paces  in  rear  of  the  right  and  left  twos  of  the 
first  company,  and  will  then  take  post  opposite  the  center  of  the 
inner  flanks  of  their  companies  ;  the  captain  of  the  fourth  com- 
pany will  halt  his  company  two  paces  in  rear  of  the  first  and 
second  companies.  A  sufficient  number  of  leading  and  rear 
sharpshooters  on  each  flank  will  take  posts,  with  two  paces 
intervals,  to  prolong  the  lines  of  the  first  and  fourth  companies 
from  the  flanks  of  the  square  to  the  building  lines.  The  re- 
maining sharpshooters  will  continue  in  their  positions  on  the 
flanks,  preferably  on  the  sidewalks. 


g.  If  the  column  is  marching,  the  captain  of  the  first  com- 
pany halts  it  at  the  command  march,  and  the  captains  of  the 
other  companies  halt  them  on  completing  the  movement  as 
described. 

10.  If  the  column  is  marching  in  quick  time,  and  the  major 
commands  double  time^  the  captain  of  the  first  company  cau- 
tions it  to  continue  the  march  in  quick  time,  and  the  captains  of 
the  other  companies  bring  them  to  quick  time  on  completing 
the  movement  as  described. 

11.  If  the  column  is  marching  in  double  time,  the  movement 
is  executed  in  the  same  manner  as  if  marching  in  quick  time, 
except  that  the  captain  of  the  first  company  commands  :  Quick 
time  at  the  first  command  of  the  major,  and  repeats  the  com- 
mand m,arch. 

12.  A  battalion  of  three  companies  will  execute  the  move- 
ment in  the  same  manner  as  a  battalion  of  four  companies, 
except  that  the  first  and  second  platoons  of  the  second  com- 
pany will  respectively  execute  the  movements  prescribed  for 
the  second  and  third  companies,  and  the  third  company  the 
movement  prescribed  for  the  fourth  company,  in  a  battalion  of 
four  companies. 

13.  A  battalion  of  two  companies  will  first  form  column  of 
platoons,  and  then  execute  the  movement  as  described  in  par. 

17. 

From  a  street  column  of  platoons  at  full  distance. 

14.  Being  at  a  halt,  the  major  commands  : 

I.  Form  street  square,  2.  March. 
At  the  first  command  the  chief  of  the  first  platoon  of  the 
first  company  cautions  it  to  stand  fast ;  the  chief  of  the  second 
platoon  of  the  first  company,  and  the  chiefs  of  the  two  platoons 
of  the  second  company,  command  :  i.  Right  forward ;  2.  Twos 
right ;  the  chiefs  of  the  two  platoons  of  the  third  companj',  and 
of  the  first  platoon  of  the  fourth  company,  command  :  i.  Left 
forward  ;  2.  Twos  left ;  the  chief  of  the  second  platoon  of  the 
fourth  company  commands :  Forward.  At  the  command 
march,  the  movement  is  executed,  and  officers,  file-closers,  and 
sharpshooters  take  their  positions  in  a  manner  similar  to  that 
described  in  par.  8. 

15.  If  the  column  of  platoons  is  marching,  the  movements 
will  be  executed  in  manner  similar  to  that  described  in  pars.  9, 
10,  and  II. 


i6.  A  battalion  of  three  companies  in  column  of  platoons 
will  execute  the  movement  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  described 
in  par.   12. 

17.  A  battalion  of  two  companies  in  column  of  platoons  will 
execute  the  movement  in  the  same  manner  as  the  first  and 
fourth  companies  in  a  battalion  of  four  companies  in  column 
of  platoons,  the  commands  and  movements  for  a  second  and 
third  company  being  omitted. 

From  a  column  of  fours. 

18.  First  form  column  of  companies  or  platoons,  according  to 
the  width  of  front  desired  for  the  square,  and  then  execute  the 
movement  as  described  in  pars.  8  or  14. 

GENERAL   RUIyES   FOR   STREET  SQUARES. 

19.  A  street  square  will  halt^  advance  oblique,  march  to  the 
rear  or  by  the  flank  by  the  same  commands  and  means  as  a 
column.  It  will  change  direction  by  moving  by  the  flank  in 
the  desired  direction,  thereby  making  the  previous  flanks  of  the 
square  the  front  and  rear  of  the  square. 

20.  The  width  of  a  square  may  be  increased  by  reinforcing 
the  front  and  rear  lines  of  sharpshooters  by  sharpshooters  taken 
from  the  flanks.  It  may  be  slightly  reduced  by  breaking  files 
from  the  right  and  left  of  the  first  company  to  the  rear,  and 
from  the  right  and  left  of  the  fourth  company  to  the  front.  If, 
however,  the  small  size  of  the  companies,  or  the  narrowness  of 
the  streets,  makes  it  necessary,  the  battalion  should  be  formed 
in  street  column  of  platoons  instead  of  street  column  of  com- 
panies. 

21.  The  flanks  of  a  square  may  be  faced  inward  or  outward, 
as  occasion  may  require,  by  the  command  :  Tzvos  right  {or 
left).  In  passing  intersecting  streets  the  flanks  of  the  square 
may  be  faced  outward  and  cross  the  .space  by  side  step  if  cir- 
cumstances require. 

TO   REDUCE  STREET  SQUARE 

From,  square  of  company  front  to  street  column  of  companies. 

22.  Being  at  a  halt,  the  major  commands  : 

I.  Form  street  column,  2.  March. 
At  the  first  command  the  captain  of  the  first  company  com- 
mands, Foi^mrd ;  the  captains  of  the  other  companies  caution 


their  companies  to  stand  fast.  At  the  command  inarch,  the 
major  and  staff  and  the  captain  of  the  first  company  will  pass 
around  the  flanks  of  that  company  and  take  their  posts  in  front 
of  it ;  the  non-commissioned  staff  and  the  file-closers  of  the 
fovirth  company  will  pass  around  the  flanks  of  that  company 
and  take  their  posts  in  rear  of  it ;  the  sharpshooters  will  resume 
the  positions  assigned  them  in  par.  5.  When  the  first  company 
has  advanced  company  distance,  the  second  company  will  exe- 
cute, Left  front  into  line -the  left  files  lessening  their  oblique 
suflSciently  to  clear  the  flank  of  the  third  company  ;  when  the 
second  company  has  advanced  company  distance,  the  third  com- 
pau}'  will  execute  Right  front  into  line,  and  at  the  same  instant 
the  fourth  company  will  execute  Forward. 

23.  If  the  square  is  marching,  the  captains  of  the  second, 
third,  and  fourth  companies  halt  them  at  the  command,  march, 
and  the  captain  of  the  first  company  halts  it  on  completing  the 
movement  as  described. 

24.  If  the  square  is  marching  in  quick  tiine^  and  the  major 
commands  double  time,  the  captains  of  the  second,  third,  and 
fourth  companies  caution  them  to  continue  the  march  in  quick 
time,  and  the  captain  of  the  first  company  brings  it  to  quick 
time  on  completing  the  movement  as  described. 

25.  If  the  sqiiare  is  marching  in  double  time,  the  movement 
is  executed  in  the  same  manner  as  if  marching  in  quick  time, 
except  that  the  captains  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  com- 
panies, command  :  Quick  ihne  at  the  first  command  of  the 
major,  and  repeat  the  command  march. 

26.  A  battalion  of  three  companies  will  execute  the  move- 
ment in  the  same  manner  as  a  battalion  of  four  companies, 
except  that  the  first  and  second  platoons  of  the  second  com- 
pany will  respectively  execute  the  movements  prescribed  for 
the  second  and  third  companies,  and  the  third  company  the 
movement  prescribed  for  the  fourth  company,  in  a  battalion  of 
four  companies. 

From,  square  of  platoon  front  to  street  cohcmn  of  platoons. 

27.  Being  at  a  halt,  the  major  commands  : 

I.  Fonn  street  colum,n,  2.  March. 

At  the  first  command  the  chief  of  the  first  platoon  of  the  first 
company  commands  Forward ;  the  chiefs  of  all  other  platoons 
caution  them  to  stand  fast.     At  the  command  march,  officers. 


file-closers,  and  shaipshooters  take  their  position  iu  the  man- 
ner described  in  par.  22.  When  the  first  platoon  has  advanced 
platoon  distance,  the  second  platoon  of  the  first  company  and 
the  two  platoons  of  the  second  company  will  execute  Left  front 
into  line — the  left  files  lessening  their  oblique  sufficiently  to 
clear  the  flank  of  the  third  company  ;  when  the  second  platoon 
of  the  second  company  has  advanced  platoon  distance  beyond 
them  the  two  platoons  of  the  third  company  and  the  first  platoon 
of  the  fourth  company  will  execute  Right f'ont  into  line,  and  the 
second  platoon  of  the  fourth  company  will  execute  Forward 

28.  If  the  square  is  marching  the  movements  will  be  executed 
in   manner  similar  to  those  described  in  pars.  23,  24,  and  25. 

From  square  of  company  or  platoo7i  front  to  column  of  fours. 

29.  First  form  street  column  of  companies  or  platoons  as 
described  in  pars.  22  or  27,  and  then  column  of  fours  as  pre- 
scribed in  School  of  Battai^ion. 

FIRE   DISCIPI.INE. 

30.  Control  of  firing,  which  is  important  in  all  actions,  is 
absolutely  essential  in  street  fighting.  The  sharpshooters  will 
fire  independently  and  in  obedience  to  whatever  spepal  direc- 
tions may  be  given  them  either  individually  or  collectivelj\ 
Troops  must  be  trained  to  pay  no  attention  to  the  firing  by 
sharpshooters,  and  to  fire  only  when  and  in  such  manner  as 
directly  ordered,  and  to  immediately  cease  firing  when  ordered. 
Firing  in  a  street  should  invariably  be  delivered  kneeling  and 
preferably  by  volleys.  The  orders  to  begin  firing  and  cease 
firing  should  be  given  by  the  bugle  or  whistle. 


APPLICATION  OF  STREET-RIOT  DRILL 

TO    A 

THEEE-B  ATT  ALIO  isr    BEGIMEI^T. 


31.  In  a  three-battalion  regiment  each  battalion  will  execute 
the  movements  independently.  When  formed  in  street  squares 
the  Colonel  and  Adjutant  will  take  post  within  the  square  of 
the  First  Battalion,  the  Surgeon  and  the  Ambulance  Corps 
within  the  square  of  the  Second  Battalion,  the  Lieutenant 
Colonel  and  Sergeant  Major  within  the  square  of  the  Third 
Battalion.  Two  files  may  be  broken  in  the  center  of  the  interior 
fronts  and  rears  oif  the  squares  to  allow  ready  communication 
from  front  to  rear  of  the  column. 

32.  If  the  regiment  is  accompanied  by  Artillery,  or  by  Engi- 
neers, they  will  be  posted  between  the  First  and  Second  Bat- 
talions, the  interval  between  these  battalions  being  increased 
for  that  purpose.  To  bring  the  artillery  into  action  it  should 
be  unlimbered  in  its  position,  so  that  the  horses  may  not  disturb 
the  infantry,  and  the  guns  run  forward  by  hand  through  the 
square,  the  front  and  rear  of  the  square  moving  to  the  right 
and  left  by  the  flanks  of  platoons  so  as  to  leave  the  square 
open  and  the  front  of  the  square  into  proper  position  to  support 
the  artillery. 

33.  In  changing  direction,  when  moving  in  column  of  squares, 
each  battalion  will  advance  to  the  point  at  which  the  first  bat- 
talion changed,  and  will  then  change  direction  by  the  flank. 


(8) 


•  \ 


LECTURE  ON  STREET  RIOTS, 


LECTURE  NO.  13. 

BY   BRIGADIER   GENERAL   ALBERT   ORDWAY,    D.    C.  MILITIA. 


Street  Riots. 


The  lectures  which  have  been  dehvered  to  you  in  the 
regular  course  of  instruction  for  this  year  were  instituted 
for  the  purpose  of  instructing  you  in  the  practical  duties 
of  officers  in  field  service,  and  assumed  that  you  had 
been  called  into  service  by  the  United  States  to  meet 
apprehended  invasion  or  insurrection.  There  is,  how- 
ever, another  kind  of  service  that  you  are  more  likely 
to  be  called  upon  to  perform,  and  that  is  to  aid  and 
support  civil  authority  in  the  enforcement  of  law  or  the 
suppression  of  disorder.  As  the  performance  of  such 
duty  imposes  greater  individual  responsibility,  and  in- 
volves the  necessity  of  knowledge  of  the  limitations 
placed  on  military  power  while  acting  in  subordination 
to  civil  authority,  as  well  as  the  study  of  means  of  ap- 
plying military  force  and  tactics  in  modes  entirely  differ- 
ent from  those  used  in  the  field,  it  is  proper  to  make  it 
the  subject  of  a  separate  and  additional  lecture. 

It'is  the  proud  boast  of  a  free  people,  and  is  the 
actual  fact  in  our  own  country  and  in  England,  that 
military  authority  is  at  all  times  subordinate  to  civil 
authority.  The  reason  for  this  may  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  civil  authority  that  creates  the  military 
force;  civil  authoritj''  that  taxes  the  people  to  sup- 
port it ;  and  that  civil  authority  creates  and  maintains 
it  for  its  own  protection.  The  same  reasons  that  make 
it  necessary  for  man  to  hold  in  subjection  the  forces  of 

(290) 


^  OF  TBE        ' 

UNIVERSITY 
291 

"  .^LIFORH^ 

nature  that  he  summons  to  his  assistance— like  steam 
and  electricity — ^make  it  essential  that  the  civil  authority- 
should  hold  in  subjection  the  military  force  that  it 
creates,  as  otherwise,  in  either  case,  the  force  may  rend 
or  destroy  the  power  that  called  it  into  existence. 

The  general  enunciation  of  the  constitutional  princi- 
ple of  the  subordination  of  military  power  is  often 
made,  but  seldom  explained.  I  take  it  to  mean  that 
the  military  power,  being  subordinate,  can  neither  in- 
itiate nor  determine  any  matter ;  that  military  power 
cannot  declare  or  initiate  war,  nor  make  peace ;  that 
civil  authority  alone  can  direct  military  force  when  it 
may  fight,  and  that  civil  authority  by  declaring  peace 
can  remand  the  military  force  to  its  normal  condition. 
So  far  as  the  individuals  of  which  the  military  force  is 
composed,  it  means  that  by  taking  on  the  additional 
character  of  a  soldier  they  do  not  divest  themselves  of 
any  of  their  responsibilities  or  duties  as  citizens;  it 
■  means  that  a  soldier  can  be  arrested  by  civil  authority 
for  the  violation  of  criminal  law^,  and  is  only  exempt 
from  arrest  by  civil  process  under  the  same  general 
principle  that  exempts  civic  officers. 

There  are  occasions,  however,  on  which  this  funda- 
mental principle  of  subordination  of  military  power  is 
either  modified  or  suspended.  It  is  modified  when 
civil  authority  calls  military  force  to  its  aid.  to  the  ex- 
tent that  civil  authority  then  limits  itself  to  instructing 
the  military  force  what  it  desires  to  have  done,  but  does 
not  interfere  with  the  manner  of  doing  it.  It  is  sus- 
pended when  civil  authority  declares  martial  law,  and 
thereb}''  voluntarily  surrenders  for  a  limited  time  every 
function  and  power  it  possesses  to  the  control  of  the 
military  authority. 

It  being  evidently  essential  that  all  military  officers 
should  study  the  laws  and  precedents  governing  the  re- 


292  ^ 

lations  between  military  and  civil  authority,  and  more 
especially  necessary  that  officers  of  the  volunteer  militia 
should  understand  the  special  relations  that  exist  when 
military  force  is  called  upon  by  civil  authority  to  aid  in 
the  enforcement  of  law  or  the  preservation  of  peace,  I 
will  briefly  review  the  subject. 

CALLING   OUT   THP]   MILITIA. 

The  militia  may  be  called  out  for  service  within  its 
own  State  by  such  civic  officers  of  the  State  as  may  be 
authorized  by  its  laws  to  do  so.  It  may  be  called  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  for  service  in  its  own  or 
any  other  State,  by  the  President,  in  such  cases  as  the 
law  authorizes  him  to  do  so. 

The  subject  of  this  lecture  does  not  require  a  detailed 
consideration  of  the  questions  involved  in  the  laws  au- 
thorizing the  President  to  call  the  militia  of  the  States 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States.  The  numerous 
statutes  governing  the  action  of  the  President  may  be 
summarized  into  three  general  principles  : 

1st.  That  he  may  call  out  the  militia  of  any  or  all  the 
States  in  case  of  threatened  invasion. 

2d.  That  he  may  call  out  the  militia  of  any  or  all 
the  States  in  case  of  a  rebellion  against  the  authority  of 
of  the  United  States,  or  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  within  any  State. 

3rd.  That  in  case  anj^  State  shall  apply  to  the  Presi- 
dent for  assistance  to  enforce  its  own  laws,  or,  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  Constitution,  for  protection  "  against  do- 
mestic violence,''  he  may  call  out  the  militia  of  any 
State  or  States  except  that  of  the  State  making  the  ap- 
plication. 

So  far  as  the  regular  troops  of  the  United  States  are 
concerned,  they  cannot  act  in  aid  of  the  civil  authorities 
of  a  State  except  by  the  order  of  the  President.     It  is 


293 

carefully  stated  in  the  Digest  of  Opinions  of  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  that  "  In  a  case  of  civil  disturbance 
in  violation  of  the  laws  of  a  State  a  military  commander 
cannot  volunteer  to  intervene  with  his  command  with- 
out incurring  a  personal  responsibility  for  his  acts.  In 
the  absence  of  the  requisite  orders  he  may  not  even 
march  or  array  his  command  for  the  purpose  of  exerting 
a  moral  effect  or  an  effect  in  terrorem;  such  a  demon- 
stration, indeed,  could  only  compromise  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  while  insulting  the  sovereignty  of 
the  State." 

Within  the  States  their  respective  laws  provide  the 
mode  by  which  and,  with  more  or  less  detail,  prescribe  the 
occ8.sions  on  which,  the  civil  authorities  may  call  on  the 
militia  for  aid.  In  some  of  the  States  only  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, the  governor,  can  call  out  the  militia ; 
in  others,  various  county,  city,  or  town  authorities,  civil 
magistrates,  sheriffs,  and  other  civil  officers  may  do  so ; 
in  others,  the  local  military  commander  may  call  out 
the  troops  if,  in  his  own  judgment,  the  danger  appears 
imminent. 

On  these  points  it  is  only  necessary  for  officers  to 
familiarize  themselves  with  the  laws  of  their  respective 
States,  so  that  they  may  know  when  called  upon  that 
the  call  is  made  by  a  legally  authorized  civic  officer  and 
in  a  legal  manner.  The  military  officer  called  upon 
cannot  question  the  reason  or  the  necessity  for  the  call ; 
he  has  no  alternative  except  to  respond  to  it.  If  the  offi- 
cer called  upon  by  the  civil  authority  orders  the  troops 
of  his  command  to  parade  in  obedience  to  such  call,  the 
subordinate  officers  and  the  soldiers  of  his  command 
have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  or  question  whether 
the  call  was  made  by  a  legally  authorized  civic  officer 
in  a  legal  manner.  The  order  to  them  is  purely  a  mili- 
tary order,  and  must  be  obeyed  without  question. 


294 

The  law  of  the  District  of  Columbia  is  short  and  ex- 
plicit. You  will  find  it  in  section  45  of  the  Militia 
Law,  as  follows : 

"  That  when  there  is  in  the  District  of  Columbia  a 
tumult,  riot,  mob,  or  a  body  of  men  acting  together  by 
force  with  attempt  to  commit  a  felony,  or  to  offer  violence 
to  persons  or  propert3^  or  by  force  and  violence  to  break 
and '  resist  the  laws,  or  when  such  tumult,  riot,  or  mob 
is  threatened,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  Commissioners 
of  the  District  of  Columbia,  or  for  the  United  States 
Marshal  for  the  District  of  Columbia,  to  call  on  the  com- 
mander-in-chief to  aid  them  in  suppressing  such  violence 
and  enforcing  the  laws ;  the  commander-in-chief  shall 
thereupon  order  out  so  much  and  such  portion  of  the 
militia  as  he  may  deem  necessary  to  suppress  the  same, 
and  no  member  thereof  who  shall  be  thus  ordered  out 
by  proper  authority  for  any  such  duty  shall  be  liable  to 
civil  or  criminal  prosecution  for  any  act  done  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  military  duty." 

CIVIC   CONTROL   OF   MILITIA   CALLED   OUT. 

It  is  important  for  officers  to  study  the  law  and  the 
precedents  governing  their  relations  with,  and  the  extent 
or  limits  of  their  subordination  to,  the  civil  authorities, 
after  being  legally  called  out  and  having  reported  to 
them  for  duty. 

When  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
the  third  case  I  have  previously  specified  is  the  only 
one  which  specially  concerns  us  in  discussing  the  sub- 
ject of  this  lecture,  and  that  only  concerns  us  so  far  as 
to  know  what  relations  the  troops  of  the  United  States 
would  hold,  that  is,  what  subordination  they  would  be 
under,  to  the  civil  authorities  of  the  State  which  had 
invoked  their  aid. 

In  the  railroad  riots  of  1877  the  troops  sent  by  the 
United  States  to  West  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  Penn- 
sylvania were  directed  to  report  to  and  act  under  the 


295 

orders  of  the  governors  of  those -States.  This  direct 
subordination  to  local  civil  authority  was  strongly- 
objected  to  by  General  Hancock,  who  suggested  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  "that  when  State  governments  de- 
clare their  inability  to  suppress  domestic  insurrection 
through  the  military  channels,  and  call  upon  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  to  intervene,  he  should  not 
do  it  through  the  civil  powers  of  the  States,  which  have 
already  failed,  but  by  the  intervention  of  the  Federal 
authorities  by  military  force,  himself  exercising  the 
control."  In  these  views  the  digest  of  opinions  of  the 
Judge  Advocate  General  coincide  by  the  statement 
that :  "  A  military  force  employed  according  to  article 
IV,  sec.  4,  of  the  Constitution,  is  to  remain  under  the 
direction  and  orders  of  the  President,  as  commander- 
in-chief,  and  his  military  subordinates;  it  .cannot  be 
placed  under  the  direct  orders  or  exclusive  disposition 
of  the  governor  of  the  State." 

Probably  the  true  solution  of  the  matter  is  that 
United  States  troops,  or  militia  called  into  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  on  such  occasions  should  hold  the 
same  relation  to  the  supreme  civil  authorities  of  the 
State  in  which  they  are  operating  that  in  other  cases  the 
State  troops  would  hold  to  the  sheriff,  or  other  civil 
authority  of  their  own  State,  that  had  invoked  their 
aid — that  is,  they  should  report  to  the  supreme  civil 
authority  for  information  and  instruction  in  the  pur- 
poses to  be  accomplished ;  should  co-operate  in  every 
way  in  accomplishing  those  purposes,  but  should  not 
and  could  not  recognize  any  suggestion  as  orders  to 
govern  their  military  dispositions. 

When  called  out  by  the  State  the  laws  of  some  of 
the  States  very  clearly  prescribe  the  manner  in  which 
the  civic  and  military  officers  shall  respectively  act 
when  brought  into  conjunction.     In  many  of  the  States, 


296 

however,  their  laws  are .  silent  on  this  point.  Where 
there  are  specific  laws,  every  officer  should  become 
thoroughly  familiar  with  them;  where  there  are  no 
specific  laws,  every  officer  should  become  thoroughly 
familiar  with  common  law  and  precedent.  In  either 
case  officers  should  not  wait  for  the  time  of  action  to 
inquire  what  they  should  or  may  do;  every  officer 
should,  by  careful  thought  and  study  of  supposed  situ- 
ations, know  what  he  would  do  when  those  situations 
become  realities. 

The  body  of  troops  responding  in  obedience  to  the 
call  of  the  civil  authorities  is  not  a  posse  comitatus,  of 
which  each  individual  is  called  out  individually  by  the 
civic  officers,  and  in  which  each  individual  is  subject  to 
the  orders  of  the  civic  officer.  The  body  of  troops,  so 
far  as  the  civic  officer  is  concerned,  is  a  unit,  and  that 
unit  is  represented  and  controlled  by  its  commanding 
officer.  The  civic  officer  can  have  no  control  or  rela- 
tions with  the  body  of  troops  except  through  their 
commanding  officer.  The  only  question,  therefore,  is 
to  what  extent  the  civic  officer  may  direct  or  control 
the  commanding  officer  of  the  military  force  that  he 
has  invoked  to  aid  him.  It  may  be  safely  accepted  as 
a  rule  established  both  by  reason  and  precedent,  that 
the  power  or  control  of  the  civic  officer  ceases  when  he  has 
communicated  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  military 
force  the  purpose  that  he  desires  to  be  accomplished^ 
and  that  he  cannot  resume  control  until  he  distinctly 
dismisses  or  remands  the  military  force  from  further 
duty.  The  military  officer  should,  therefore,  on  report- 
ing to  the  civic  officer  in  response  to  his  call  or  in 
obedience  to  orders  of  higher  military  authority,  de- 
mand of  the  civic  officer  that  he  give  him  in  writing 
the  purpose  or  object  he  requires  to  be  accomplished, 
and  if  the  civic  officer  refuses  or  "is  unable  to  give  it  in 


297 

writing,  that  he  require  him  ta  state  it  verbally  in  pres- 
ence of  a  proper  number  of  witnesses.  From  that 
moment  the  power  of  the  civic  officer  ceases,  and  it  is 
for  the  military  officer  alone  to  determine  how  he  will 
accomplish  the  duty  required  of  him. 

General  Napier  expressed  the  matter  in  these  words  : 
^^  How  to  use  this  force  in  his  (the  soldier's)  trade  ;  but 
it  is  not  his  trade  to  decide  when  it  should  be  used  against 
his  countrymen.  He  may  play  the  part  of  a  druggist, 
but  that  of  the  physician  appertains  to  the  magistrate." 

The  regulations  of  Massachusetts  cover  the  whole 
question  most  thoroughly,  and  may  be  safely  adopted 
by  any  officer  called  upon  to  perform  duty  in  a  State  in 
which  there  are  no  specific  laws  or  regulations  to  govern 
his  actions : 

"  Par.  2298.  The  civil  officer  is  not  authorized  to  inter- 
fere in  any  way  with  the  formation  or  details  of  the 
force,  the  military  officer  being  held  responsible  for  the 
success  of  the  operations  to  be  undertaken  ;  and  it  is  for 
the  latter,  and  for  him  alone,  to  judge  in  what  manner  the 
troops  shall  effect  the  object  which  the  civil  officer  has 
indicated,  and  to  direct  the  force  in  the  execution  of  the 
service  in  which  it  is  engaged." 

"  Par.  2299.  While  the  instructions  of  the  civil  officers 
are  given  in  general  terms  to  accomplish  a  particular 
purpose,  and  the  mode  and  means  are  within  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  military  commander,  the  latter,  to  prevent 
misunderstanding,  should  request  to  have  his  instruc- 
tions reduced  to  writing." 

FIRING   UPON  A   MOB. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  is  discretionary  with 
a  military  commander  how  he  will  dispose  of  and  use 
his  force  to  accomplish  the  purpose  for  which  the  civil 
authority  has  invoked  his  aid,  the  act  of  causing  or  di- 
recting the  firing  on  people  is  sufficiently  serious  to  be 
worthy  of  special  consideration. 


298 

It  is  a  general  rule  of  law  that  it  is  the  right  of  any 
citizen,  at  any  time,  to  use  force  to  prevent  the  perpetra- 
tion of  felony,  or  in  endeavoring  to  arrest  a  felonious  cul- 
prit. The  amount  of  force  he  may  legally  use  is  meas- 
ured by  the  amount  of  resistance  he  meets,  and  if 
homicide  becomes  necessary  to  accomplish  the  purpose, 
law  justifies  the  killing. 
^  A  riot  may  be  defined  as  an  unlawful  assemblage  of 
persons  who  use  violence  to  accomplish  their  purposes. 
This  constitutes  a  felony,  and  therefore  the  killing  of 
any  participant  in  the  riot  is  clearly  justifiable  if  the 
riot  cannot  be  suppressed  by  less  violent  means. 

It  is  also  a  principle  of  law  that  '*  homicide,  or  the 
taking  of  human  life,  is  justifiable  when  necessarily 
committed  by  public  officers  and  those  acting  under 
their  command  or  in  their  aid  and  assistance  in  over- 
coming resistance  to  the  execution  of  legal  process  or 
the  discharge  of  any  other  legal  duty."  One  eminent 
jurist  goes  so  far  as  to  make  the  broad  statement  that 
"  if  officers  of  the  law,  when  engaged  in  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  peace,  find  it  necessary  to  take  life,  such 
homicide  is  justifiable."  It  is  further  clearly  established 
that  homicide  committed  in  dispersing  an  unlawful 
\J  assembly  is  justifiable.  By  an  unlawful  assembly  is 
meant  one  which  meets  for  a  purpose  which,  if  executed, 
would  make  them  rioters.  Though  such  an  assembly 
may  not  have  committed  any  overt  act  or  violence  that 
would  constitute  felony,  yet  if  the  civil  authorities  deem 
it  necessary  or  proper  to  disperse  the  assembly,  and  call 
upon  the  military  authorities  to  assist  them  in  doing  so, 
the  law  will  regard  as  justifiable  homicide  the  necessary 
killing  of  any  participant  in  the  assembly. 

The  question  whether  a  person  killed  was  a  partici- 
pant's settled  by  the  rule  of  law  that  "  those  present 
at  the  commission  of  a  riotous  felony  are  principals," 


299 

and  is  put  beyond  all  question  if  the  proper  officer  has 
commanded  the  assembly  to  disperse  before  the  firing 
was  ordered.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  in  many  States 
the  law  requires  that  the  civic  officer  shall  order  the  as- 
sembly to  disperse  before  he  turns  them  over  to  the  care 
of  the  military  officer;  if  he  omits  to  do  so,  it  is  well  for 
the  military  officer  to  do  so  before  proceeding  to  extreme 
measures.  It  is  not  necessary  to  "  read  the  riot  act "  or 
law;  a  notice  or  command  to  disperse  is  all  that  is 
requisite,  and  in  emergencies  even  this  formality  may 
be  dispensed  with.    • 

Verbal  notices  or  orders  can  be  heard  by  only  a  few 
in  the  front  ranks  of  a  mob,  and  I  would  suggest  that  it 
might  be  well  to  adopt  a  universal  signal,  which  would 
be  universally  understood  as  giving  notice  to  a  mob  to 
disperse  before  opening  fire  on  it.  Sounding  the  "  long 
roll "  on  the  drums  would  make  an  excellent  signal  for 
this  purpose. 

From  what  I  have  quoted  of  law  and  legal  decisions, 
it  seems  safe  to  assort,  as  a  legal  proposition,  that  if  a 
military  commander  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretionary 
power  as  to  the  means  of  carrying  out  the  instructions 
of  the  civic  officer  deems  it  proper  to  order  his  troops  to 
fire  upon  either  a  riotous  or  unlawful  assembly,  and 
should  thereby  cause  the  death  of  either  participants  or 
so-called  spectators,  he  could  not  be  held  answerable  for 
such  result. 

While  the  taking  of  human  life  does  not  involve  legal 
responsibility  under  the  conditions  I  have  cited,  it  always 
entails  moral  responsibility,  and  no  military  officer 
should  give  the  fatal  order  until  it  is  clearly  evident  that 
he  cannot  otherwise  carry  out  the  demands  and  instruc- 
tions of  the  civic  authorities,  or  it  is  made  necessary  for 
the  security  of  the  troops  under  his  command.  When 
it  does  become  necessary  to  fire  on  a  mob,  it  is  merciful 


300 

to  make  the  fire  short,  relentless,  and  effective.  Above 
all,- every  soldier  must  remember  that  it  should  make 
no  difference  to  him  whether  the  mob  is  composed  of 
millionaires  or  paupers,  capitalists  or  laborers,  aliens  or 
Americans,  enemies  or  friends  and  neighbors,  or  even  if 
the  riotous  assemblage  has  been  caused  by  well-founded 
grievances.  Our  duty  is  both  simple  and  clear — to  main- 
tain and  enforce  law  without  consideration  of  the  class 
of  people  that  may  be  resisting  it,  and  without  regard  to 
our  personal  views  of  the  injustice  of  the  law  or  the  jus- 
tice of  the  grievances  that  may  arise  under  it. 

SEIZURE   AND   USE   OF   PRIVATE   PROPERTY. 

In  operations  against  rioters  it  often  becomes  nec- 
essary to  convert  private  property  to  public  use,  or  to 
seize  and  destroy  it;  as,  for  instance,  to  convert  the 
nearest  available  means  to  use  in  making  barricades ; 
to  destroy  a  private  building  occupied  by  rioters ;  or  to 
seize  food  for  the  sustenance  of  the  troops.  When  the 
danger  is  immediate,  or  the  necessity  so  urgent  that  no 
delay  is  possible,  the  military  commander  should  not 
hesitate.  While  he  may  render  himself  liable  to  civil 
action,  there  are  so  many  legal  decisions  to  sustain  him 
that  he  need  have  no  fear  of  the  results,  provided  he 
has  not  exercised  his  discretionary  power  in  a  corrupt 
or  malicious  manner.  The  law  that  protects  the  mil- 
itary commander  in  taking  human  life  will  surely 
protect  him  in  taking  private  property.  "The  Gov- 
ernment, not  the  officer,  is  responsible  for  the  property 
taken  for  public  use ;  and  a  subsequent  ratification 
of  the  act  by  the  Government  is  equivalent  to  prior 
authority  to  do  it." 

GIVING   AND   OBEYING   ORDERS. 

It  is  prescribed  by  the  Articles  of  War,  and  is  a  mili- 
tary axiom,  that  a  subordinate  must  obey  all  lawful  or- 


301 

ders  of  a  superior.  It  is  equally  true  that  obedience  to  an 
illegal  order  of  a  superior  will  not  protect  an  inferior 
against  military  or  civil  punishment  for  results  that 
may  follow.  It  is,  therefore,  important  that  you  should 
carefully  study  this  distinction,  as  it  is  appHcable  to  all 
phases  of  military  duty  as  well  as  the  one  we  are  now 
considering. 

There  have  been  many  trials,  both  military  and  civic, 
in  England  and  in  this  country  involving  the  question 
of  the  extent  of  the  right  of  a  subordinate  to  judge  of 
the  legality  or  illegality  of  the  order  of  a  superior.  Ex- 
tracts from  some  of  the  decisions  of  the  highest  courts 
and  from  the  opinions  of  eminent  jurists  may  make 
the  point  clear  to  you.  One  decision  says :  "  The  order 
must  expressly  and  clearly  show  on  its  face,  or  in 
the  body  thereof,  its  illegality ;  and  this  must  appear  at 
once  to  a  common  mind  on  hearing  it  read  or  given ;  nor 
has  the  inferior  a  right  to  inquire  of  the  superior  the 
object  and  purpose  he  has  in  view."  The  reason  for 
this  is  clearly  stated  in  another  decision  as  follows: 
"  The  first  duty  of  a  soldier  is  obedience,  and  without 
this  there  can  be  neither  discipline  nor  efficiency  in  an 
army.  If  every  subordinate  ofiicer  and  soldier  were  at 
liberty  to  question  the  legality  of  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander and  obey  them  or  not  as  they  may  consider 
them  valid  or  invalid,  the  camp  would  be  turned  into  a 
debating  school,  where  the  precious  moments  for  action 
would  be  lost  in  wordy  conflicts  between  the  advocates 
of  conflicting  opinions."  Therefore,  as  clearly  stated 
in  another  decision,  any  ofiicer  or  soldier  may  safely 
act  as  ordered  by  superior  authority  without  fear  of  the 
consequences,  "  except  in  plain  case  of  excess  of  author- 
ity, where  at  first  blush  it  is  apparent  and  palpable  to 
the  commonest  understanding  that  the  order  is  illegal." 

It  being  thus  evident  that  if  any  one  can  be  held  re- 


302 

sponsible  for  acts  done  it  must  be  to  the  superior  mili- 
tary authority  that  gives  the  order  for  doing  them,  it 
becomes  interesting  to  study  the  precedents  from  which 
rules  may  be  drawn  by  which  the  superior  may  safely 
govern  his  action ;  and  as  a  subaltern  officer  may  at 
any.  time  be  placed  in  a  position  which  he  will  be  the 
superior  military  authority  present,  and  therefore  in- 
.  vested  with  the  responsibility  of  giving  orders,  it  is 
important  that  officers  of  all  grades  should  study  the 
questions  we  are  now  discussing. 

I  have  stated  that  a  subordinate  will  not  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  executing  the  lawful  orders  of  his  superior. 
It  is  also  equally  true  that  a  superior  will  not  be  held 
responsible  for  any  of  the  unauthorized  acts  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. The  liability  of  a  superior  officer  was  broadly 
stated  by  Lord  Mansfield  to  be,  that  "  a  public  officer 
who  acts  without  authority,  or  exceeds  his  authority,  is 
liable  ^  *  *  for  the  act  done  without  or  in  excess 
of  his  authority."  The  measure  of  an  officer's  author- 
ity may  be  accepted  as  definitely  settled  by  the  results 
of  numerous  trials  in  England,  beginning  as  far  back  as 
the  time  of  Charles  II,  and  by  many  decisions  of  our 
own  courts. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  duties  that  a  military  officer 
may  be  called  upon  to  perform — ministerial  duties  and 
discretionary  duties.  Ministerial  duty  is  simply  definite 
duty ;  duty  imposed  by  law ;  duty  in  respect  to  which 
nothing  is  left  to  discretion  ;  duty  which  allows  the  offi- 
cer no  power  to  judge  of  the  matter  to  be  done.  Dis- 
cretionary duty  has  been  defined  by  the  courts  to  be, 
"  when  applied  to  public  functionaries,  a  power  or  right 
conferred  upon  them  by  law  of  acting  officially  in  cer- 
tain circumstances,  according  to  the  dictates  of  their  own 
judgment  and  conscience,  uncontrolled  by  the  judgment 
or  conscience  of  another."     It  has  been  clearly  settled 


303 

by  numerous  decisions  that  an  officer  in  the  discharge 
of  discretionary  duties  "  is  not  responsible  to  any  one 
receiving  an  injury  from  such  act,  unless  the  officer  act 
maliciously  and  willfully  wrong."  It  has  also  been  set- 
tled by  judicial  decision  that  the  duties  of  an  officer  in 
suppressing  a  mob  are  discretionary  duties — that  is,  that 
while  the  law  requires  him  to  discharge  the  duty,  it 
invests  him  with  discretionary  authority  in  doing  it. 
While  it  is  true,  as  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  that  there  is  no  case  in  which  a  public 
officer  acting  from  a  sense  of  duty,  in  a  matter  where  he 
is  required  to  exercise  discretion,  is  not  liable  to  an  action 
for  error  of  judgment,  it  is  equally  true,  as  stated  by 
the  same  court,  that  "  a  public  officer,  invested  with 
certain  discretionary  power,  never  has  been  and  never 
should  be  made  answerable  for  any  injury  when  acting 
within  the  scope  of  his  authority  and  not  influenced  by 
malice,  corruption,  or  cruelty."  This  decision  practi- 
cally covers  the  whole  point  and  makes  it  unnecessary 
to  quote  from  numerous  other  decisions  bearing  on  it. 
The  consensus  of  all  decisions  is  that  when  an  officer  is 
placed  in  a  position  that  requires  him  to  exercise  dis- 
cretionary power  his  acts  "are  to  be  presumed  legal 
till  shown  by  others  to  be  unjustifiable,"  and  that  he 
cannot  be  held  answerable  for  the  effect  of  any  act  done 
by  him  through  mistake  of  law  or  error  of  judgment. 

RESPONSIBILITIES   AND   LIABILITIES. 

It  may  seem  somewhat  hazardous  to  differ  from  com- 
monly accepted  theories,  but  my  convictions  are  so 
strong  that  I  do  not  hesitate  to  express  them,  and  I 
believe  that  what  I  have  quoted  from  accepted  princi- 
ples of  law  and  from  legal  decisions  sustain  my  conclu- 
sions. 

I  have  seen  it  stated  by  one  writer  that,  "  if  assailed 
by  force  too  strong  for  its  ordinary  processes,  the  law 


304 

calls  force  to  its  defense,  but  from  its  exalted  throne  it 
judges  both  its  assailants  and  its  defenders."  I  cannot 
agree  with  this  writer.  I  believe  that  when  law  calls 
upon  force  to  defend  it,  that  law  will  protect  those  it  calls 
to  its  defense  so  long  as  the  means  employed  by  force 
and  the  results  of  employing  those  means  are  kept  within 
the  pre-established  precepts  laid  down  by  law  itself. 

The  impression  is  too  general  and  has  been  too  long 
uncontradicted,  that  a  military  officer  puts  himself  in 
great  jeopardy  of  civil  or  criminal  punishment  on  the 
one  hand  or  court-martial  on  the  other  in  the  discharge 
of  duties  imposed  upon  him  by  law.  I  cannot  assent  to 
this  doctrine — ^in  fact,  I  venture  to  contradict  it.  To 
admit  it  would  paralyze  the  efficiency  of  the  military 
force  and  make  all  their  efforts  weak  and  vacillating. 
The  theory  and  tendency  of  all  modern  legislation  is 
directly  the  reverse,  and  there  are  few,  if  any,  judicial 
decisions  to  support  it. 

The  laws  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  New  York, 
Wisconsin,  Alabama,  the  District  of  Columbia,  and 
several  of  the  other  States  distinctly  provide  that  a 
military  officer  shall  not  be  held  liable  to  civil  or  crim- 
inal punishment  for  acts  done  in  the  discharge  of  his 
duty  in  rendering  aid  to  the  civil  authorities.  Undoubt- 
edly the  laws  of  all  the  States  will  make  similar  provis- 
ions whenever  they  are  revised.  In  those  States  in  which 
no  specific  laws  are  as  yet  enacted  the  common  law  and 
legal  precedent  afford  ample  security  to  all  officers  in 
the  discharge  of  their  duties,  and  especially  no  subor- 
dinate officer  or  soldier  need  give  himself  the  slightest 
concern  in  obeying  the  lawful  orders  of  his  superior. 
Every  citizen  in  the  ordinary  routine  of  life  is  liable  to 
arrest  and  trial  on  civil  and  criminal  charges  of  which 
he  is  wholly  innocent.  We  see  this  exemplified  every 
day  in  the  courts.     What  I  affirm  is  that  a  military 


305  ' 

officer  is  subject  to  no  greater  hazard  or  jeopardy  in  the 
performance  of  his  duty  than  any  citizen  is  subject  to  in 
the  discharge  of  the  ordinary  duties  of  life. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

To  impress  upon  your  minds  the  principal  points  I 
have  endeavored  to  illustrate  in  the  preceding  remarks, 
I  will  briefly  summarize  the  following  as  the  most  im- 
portant for  you  to  consider  and  remember  in  determin- 
ing your  conduct  when  called  into  service  by  local  civil 
authority : 

First.  That  a  military  officer  upon  whom  demand  is 
made  by  a  civic  officer  for  aid  is  obhged  to  respond  to 
it  if  the  demand  is  made  in  a  legal  manner  by  a  civic 
officer  authorized  by  law  to  make  it.  * 

Second.  That  subordinate  officers  and  soldiers  receiv- 
ing orders  from  their  superiors  to  assemble  for  the  pur- 
pose of  aiding  the  civil  authorities  cannot  question  the 
legality  of  the  call  made  upon  their  superior,  but  must 
obey  the  order  as  a  military  order. 

Third.  That  the  military  officer  called  upon  by  the 
civil  authority  or  ordered  by  superior  military  author- 
ity, having  assembled  his  force  and  reported  it  to  the 
designated  civic  officer,  should  require  from  that  officer 
specific  information,  in  writing  if  possible,  of  the  duty 
required  of  him.  Having  received  that  information  he 
should,  from  that  moment,  assume  supreme  control  of 
the  situation,  and  in  no  event  allow  the  civic  officer  to 
control  his  dispositions  or  permit  him  to  give  any  orders 
or  directions  to  the  force  under  his  command. 

Fourth.  That  superior  or  commanding  officers  will 
not  be  held  responsible  for  any  act  done  or  order  given 
by  them,  or  the  results  following  from  any  such  act  or 
order,  provided  they  act  according  to  their  best  judg- 
ment on  what  they  suppose  to  be  the  actual  facts  and 
20 


306 

are  not  governed  by  malice  or  corruption  ;  nor  will  they 
be  held  responsible  for  any  unauthorized  act  of  their 
subordinates. 

Fifth.  Subordinates  will  not  be  held  responsible  for 
any  act  done  by  them  under  the  lawful  orders  of  their 
superiors.  They  may  kill,  burn,  or  destroy  with  abso- 
lute impunity  if  their  superiors  lawfully  order  them  to 
do  so.  In  such  case  the  superior  will  be  held  respon- 
sible for  the  legality  of  his  orders  and  the  results  of 
them.  If  a  subordinate  does  an  act  not  authorized  or 
directed  by  his  superior,  or  under  an  unlawful  order  of 
his  superior,  he  may  be  held  responsible  for  its  results. 

Sixth.  Remember,  however,  that  it  is  better  to  err  on 
the  side  of  yielding  subordination  to  civil  authority 
jjather  than  insist  on  the  military  rights  I  have  indi- 
cated, if  the  occasion  should  seem  to  require  it,  and  you 
would  not  thereby  jeopardize  the  safety  of  your  com- 
mand. 

MILITARY   VIEW   OF   RIOTS. 

Having  considered  the  legal  aspect  of  riots  and  the  re- 
lations that  exist  between  the  military  and  civil  author- 
ities in  suppressing  them,  it  remains  for  us  to  con- 
sider the  equally  important  military  questions  involved 
in  the  methods  of  applying  military  force  to  this  pur- 
pose. 

It  is  fully  as  important  in  this  country  to  prepare  for 
internal  disorder  as  for  external  danger ;  as  much  reason 
to  provide  for  suppressing  riots  as  to  provide  for  coast 
defense. 

Our  people  seem  to  be  wholly  blind  to  the  lessons  of 
the  past,  the  dangers  of  the  present,  or  the  possibilities 
of  the  future 

In  1877  an  insignificant  trouble  at  the  small  town  of 
Martinsburg,  in    West  Virginia,  suddenly  developed 


307 

proportions  that  overshadowed  the  whole  country.  In 
less  than  forty-eight  hours  fifty  thousand  miles  of 
railway  were  inoperative  and  sovereign  States  were 
appealing  in  the  most  abject  manner  to  the  Federal 
Government  for  protection.  Millions  of  dollars'  worth 
of  property  were  destroyed,  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of 
human  labor  lost,  and  the  fabric  of  lawful  order  re- 
ceived a  severe  blow.  If  all  of  this  was  done  in  1877 
without  premeditation,  and  without  a  definite  purpose  in 
view,  for  which  previous  organization  under  competent 
leaders  had  been  made,  it  is  fearful  to  contemplate  what 
might  occur  in  the  future.  Since  that  time  our  country 
has  been  overrun  by  hundreds  of  thousands  of  the 
most  criminal  and  ignorant  classes  of  Europe,  who  can 
neither  assimilate  with  our  people  nor  appreciate  or 
understand  the  meaning  of  our  institutions  or  the  force 
of  our  laws — men  who  know  no  law  but  force  and  can 
appreciate  no  punishment  less  than  death.  Following 
in  the  wake  of  this  horde  of  immigrants  have  come  the 
professional  agitators,  who  may  be  called  the  pimps  of 
the  professional  leaders,  who  have  come  to  live  on  the 
tolls  they  levy  on  these  ignorant  people  while  they 
organize  and  train  them  for  their  own  diabolical  pur- 
poses. These  professional  leaders  are  by  no  means  to 
be  despised.  They  are  generally  men  who  have  had  a 
military  education,  have  held  rank  and  position  in 
various  armies,  have  had  experience  in  war,  but  who 
through  their  own  vices  have  been  dismissed  from  all 
honorable  service  and  ostracised  from  respectable  society, 
and  though  having  been  reared  to  despise  those  who 
labor,  make  dupes  of  them  that  they  may  live  upon 
their  contributions  and  the  possibilities  of  the  future. 
If  you  ever  have  occasion  to  meet  these  men  you  will 
find  that  they  are  no  tyros  in  the  art  of  war  and  will 
be  a  match   for  the  best  intelligence  we   can  bring 


308 

against  them.  The  hand  of  these  people  is  not  shown 
in  ordinary  affairs,  but  we  know  enough  of  them,  of  the 
organizations  they  control,  of  their  purposes,  and  of 
their  means  of  accomplishing  these  purposes,  to  know 
that  when  the  time  comes  that  they  consider  favorable 
the  riots  of  1877  will  be  remembered  as  trifling  affairs 
compared  with  what  will  then  confront  us. 

Any  thoughtful  person,  and  especially  a  military  ob- 
server, must  realize  the  fact  that  riots  in  the  future  will 
be  more  frequent  and  more  formidable  than  in  the  past, 
^  inasmuch  as  when  honest  but  misguided  men  may  be 
brought  to  the  sudden  frenz}^  of  resisting  lawful  govern- 
ment the  opportunity  will  be  seized  by  the  professional 
rioter  and  anarchist  to  accomplish  their  own  purposes. 
This  view  is  amply  sustained  by  many  facts  known  to 
the  police  authorities,  and  is  clearly  indicated  in  the 
brief  cablegrams  contained  in  our  newspapers  describ- 
ing recent  riots  in  Europe. 

A  few  weeks  ago  the  cable  account  of  a  riot  in  Brad- 
ford, England,  said  that  the  rioters  not  only  barricaded 
the  streets  on  their  front,  but  that  they  also  barricaded 
all  the  side  streets  on  their  flanks,  and  were  only  routed 
by  a  vigorous  attack  on  their  rear.  It  was  certainly  no 
novice  who  conducted  that  defense. 

The  cablegrams  of  the  past  few  days,  describing  riots 
that  occurred  in  various  cities  in  Europe  on  the  first  of 
May,  though  meagre  in  detail,  contain  enough  to  justify 
the  same  conclusion. 

The  fearful  slaughter  of  the  brave  policemen  of  Chi- 
cago in  Haymarket  square  was  only  one  feature  of  a 
prearranged  plan  that  failed  simply  by  lack  of  coopera- 
tion, and  the  single  dynamite  bomb  that  caused  their 
death  y^sls  only  one  of  many  that  had  been  prepared  for 
far  more  serious  work.  Are  we  to  hope  or  expect  that 
such  an  attempt  will  never  be  made  again,  or  that  when 


309 

made  the  anarchists  will  not  profit  by  their  former 
failure,  while  we  pay  not  the  slightest  attention  to  the 
lessons  that  the  attempt  should  have  taught  us. 

Riots  originate  from  various  causses.  They  have  been 
caused  by  religion,  politics,  race  prejudices,  and  in  later 
years  by  labor  agitators.  They  may  be  either  sponta- 
neous or  incited.  Nearly  all  the  riots  of  former  years 
have  been  spontaneous ;  those  of  the  future  we  may  ex- 
pect to  be  premeditated  and  incited.  From  whatever 
cause  they  may  originate,  or  whatever  class  of  people 
may  compose  them,  all  riots  result  in  forcibly  resisting 
the  enforcement  of  law,  and  therefore  we  can  make  no 
distinction  in  our  treatment  of  them,  no  matter  what 
our  own  religion,  politics,  or  condition  of  life  may  be. 

In  considering  the  elements  of  society  most  likely  to 
be  involved  in  riotous  assemblages,  distinction  should 
be  made  between  labor  organizations,  socialists,  and  an- 
archists. All  of  these  terms  seem  foreign  to  our  institu- 
tions, but  nevertheless  they  are  transplanted  to  our 
midst,  and  we  must  learn  their  purposes  and  under- 
stand their  meaning. 

Labor  organizations  are  formed  with  the  praiseworthy 
purpose  of  ameliorating  or  improving  the  condition  of 
laborers  by  peaceable  and  legal  organizations.  The  good 
intentions  of  such  organizations  are  one  thing,  the  results 
that  may  follow  are  another.  The  power  in  the  hands 
of  these  organizations  is  tremendous.  It  would  be  neces- 
sary to  assert  human  infallibility  to  assume  that  this 
power  will  never  be  exercised  to  promote  the  fortunes 
or  purposes  of  unscrupulous  leaders  who  may  get  con- 
trol of  it.  We  know  that  it  has  been  done  on  some  oc- 
casions in  the  past  and  we  know  that  it  will  be  more 
likely  to  occur  in  the  future  in  proportion  to  the  intro- 
duction of  foreign  labor  and  foreign  ideas.  This  is  indi- 
cated by  the  fact  that  the  labor  organizations,  after  fail- 


310 

ing  in  any  other  way  to  accomplish  a  declared  purpose, 
such  as  increase  of  wages,  fewer  hours  of  work,  the 
restoration  of  a  discharged  laboi'or,  resort  to  a  "  strike  "  to 
accomplish  it.  Unfortunately  "  strikes  "  generally  result 
in  the  employment  and  exercise  of  force.  It  forces  the 
unwilling  to  cease  labor  and  forcibly  prevents  the  will- 
ing from  assuming  labor.  It  says  to  the  contented 
laborer,  who  has  his  pleasant  home  that  shelters  his 
happy  family  partly  paid  for,  and  who  is  cheerfully 
laboring  to  discharge  the  balance  of  his  payments,  you 
shall  not  work ;  and  it  says  to  the  skilled  laborer,  who  may 
have  expended  the  last  dollar  of  his  savings  in  endeavor- 
ing to  prolong  the  life  of  an  invalid  wife  and  in  the  care 
of  his  helpless  children,  your  wife  may  die,  your  children 
may  starve,  and  you  may  become  a  convict  for  resisting 
us,  but  you  shall  not  work.  These  are  not  labor  organi- 
zations or  methods  that  any  free-born  American  laborer 
can  tolerate  or  sympathize  with.  They  are  cruel  and 
tyrannical  powers  enforcing  the  worst  form  of  human 
slavery  by  the  exercise  of  brutal  force.  Force  begets 
force.  If  the  workingmen  are  led  by  unscrupulous  men 
to  adopt  the  methods  of  anarchy  they  should  know  that 
the  elements  of  anarchy  will  seek  to  cooperate  with 
them,  and  that  they  would  thereby  be  involved  in  the 
fate  that  must  always  finally  come  to  anarchy — ruin  or 
despotism.  It  has,  however,  been  greatly  to  the  credit 
of  American  labor,  and  a  hopeful  sign  for  the  future,  that 
they  are  seldom  found  in  the  ranks  of  a  mob,  no  matter 
for  what  grievances  they  may  be  endeavoring  to  procure 
redress.  It  was  stated  by  one  officer,  in  reference  to  the 
riots  of  1877  in  Pennsylvania,  "  that  not  fifteen  per  cent, 
of  the  railroad  employes  were  participants  or  sympa- 
thizers." It  was  stated  still  more  strongly  by  another 
officer  that  the  mobs  were  "  composed  of  roughs,  tramps, 
unknown  men,  from  where  no  one  knew,  and  a  few 


311 

striking  railroad  men."  These  facts  should  teach  the 
lawless  element  among  the  workingmen  that  if  they 
listen  to  the  specious  arguments  of  the  anarchist  they  will 
not  have  the  support  of  their  intelligent  fellow-workmen, 
and  should  also  convince  the  soldier  that  any  mob  he 
may  be  called  upon  to  face  which  has  been  organized 
under  the  plea  of  wrongs  of  labor  to  be  redressed,  in- 
stead of  being  composed  of  workingmen  is  in  reality 
composed  of  at  least  eighty-five  per  cent,  of  roughs, 
tramps,  thieves,  convicts,  and  anarchists,  whom  he  need 
have  no  compunctions  in  effectually  eradicating. 

The  socialists  should  not  be  confounded  with  the 
anarchists.  The  socialist  is  generally  a  mild  sort  of 
being,  who  indulges  in  vague  theories  of  the  proper  con-  r/ 
struction  of  human  society.  He  is  a  dreamer,  and  no 
more  to  be  feared  than  any  other  harmless  lunatic, 
except  so  far  as  he  may  lend  aid  and  countenance  to 
putting  his  theories  into  active  opposition  to  legally 
established  government. 

The  anarchist  is  the  natural  product  of  socialistic 
theories  practically  applied.  He  believes  or  asserts  a 
belief  in  a  condition  of  society  in  which  there  shall  be 
no  law  or  no  supreme  power,  and  in  which  every  in- 
dividual shall  do  whatever  he  pleases  with  perfect  im- 
punity. Even  hell  is  assumed  to  have  a  ruler,  and 
he  is  generally  pictured  as  not  only  a  most  powerful, 
but  a  most  adroit  ruler.  If  one  could  imagine  hell 
without  a  ruler  he  might  form  a  slight  conception  of 
what  this  earth  would  be  if  anarchy  should  prevail. 
The  anarchist  is  a  professional  rioter,  and  he  brings  to 
his  profession  all  of  the  arts  of  diplomacy,  the  skill  of 
science,  and  the  knowledge  of  experience.  If  you  are 
ever  brought  in  contact  with  a  mob,  let  us  hope  that 
the  anarchists  will  constitute  the  front  ranks,  if  not  the 
entire  body  of  it.  What  otherwise  might  be  a  duty  will- 
then  become  a  pleasure. 


312 

To  solve  any  problem  requires  a  statement  of  the  defi- 
nite propositions  on  which  the  problem  is  based.  The 
military  problems  arising  from  street  riots  do  not  admit 
of  preconceived  definite  propositions,  for  the  reason 
that  every  riot  will  differ  in  cause,  composition,  and  pur- 
pose, and  each  of  these  points  must  be  considered  in 
determining  how  to  deal  with  a  riot.  We  might  fill 
volumes  in  assuming  almost  every  condition  and  com- 
bination of  conditions  that  we  could  conceive,  and  then, 
in  fact,  an  officer  would  probably  be  confronted  by  a 
condition  wholly  diff'erent  from  any  he  had  studied. 

CHARACTER   OF   RIOTS. 

Primarily,  riots  may  be  divided  into  two  types : 
One  type  is  a  spontaneous  riotous  assemblage,  con- 
fined to  a  single  locality  or  limited  district  in  a  city, 
lacking  organization,  and  without  definite  purposes  or 
recognized  leadership.  Such  riots  may  be  quickly  sup- 
pressed and  easily  dispersed  by  inferior  military  force ; 
and,  if  the  military  force  is  under  a  proper  and  compe- 
tent commander,  with  little  or  no  bloodshed.  Fortun- 
ately nearly  all  the  riots  that  have  occurred  in  our 
country  have  been  of  this  type. 

The  other  type  is  a  premeditated  and  general  uprising, 
covering,  or  liable  to  cover,  the  whole  territory  of  a  city ; 
with  definite  purposes  and  definite  plans  for  accomplish- 
ing those  purposes,  and  with  its  forces  carefully  organ- 
ized and  skillfully  led.  If  such  a  riot  should  assume 
the  off'ensive,  the  methods  of  defeating  it  would  be 
quickly  perceptible  to  any  military  mind;  but  if  it 
should  assume  the  defensive,  barricade  strategic  points 
in  various  parts  of  a  large  city,  and  occupy  houses  on 
the  streets  leading  to  its  strongholds  with  riflemen  and 
dynamite  bomb  throwers,  it  would  task  an  overwhelm- 
ing force  and  great  military  genius  to  subdue  it.  The 
nearest  approach  in  our  country  to  this  type  of  riots 


313 

have  been  the  "  draft  riots  "  in  New  York  city  in  1863, 
and  the  "  railroad  riots  "  in  1877,  which  extended  over 
many  States.  Fortunately,  in  both  cases,  the  uprisings 
being  either  unpremeditated  or  prematurely  begun, 
lacked  organization  and  leadership. 

The  local  riot  may  lead  to  the  general  riot,  or  riots 
may  occur  which  combine  in  all  possible  proportions 
the  various  elements  of  both.  It  being,  therefore,  evi- 
dently impossible  to  prescribe  definite  methods  for 
dealing  with  all  riots,  I  will  limit  myself  to  the  con- 
sideration of  a  few  general  principles  covering  the  two 
types  of  riot  I  have  indicated,  simply  as  suggestive  for 
application  according  to  the  combination  of  conditions 
and  circumstances  that  may  confront  you. 

THE   ASSEMBLY. 

If  the  public  peace  is  being  disturbed  or  threatened 
to  an  extent  that  makes  it  apparently  possible  that  the 
civil  authorities  may  finally  be  obliged  to  call  on  the 
military  authorities  for  aid,  a  prudent  local  commander 
will  quietly,  and  if  possible  secretly,  keep  a  sufficient 
force  constantly  on  duty  in  the  armories  of  his  com- 
mand to  guard  them  against  sudden  surprise  and  to  pro- 
tect the  assembly  of  his  troops  if  call  should  be  made. 

If  the  call  for  troops  is  made,  this  armory  guard 
should  at  once  be  deployed  a  sufficient  distance  from 
the  building  to  protect  it  on  every  side  and  prevent 
persons  from  approaching  the  building,  except  recog- 
nized members  of  the  command  reporting  for  duty.  If 
a  crowd  of  idle  or  curious  citizens  collects,  this  small 
guard  would  be  sufficient ;  but  if  it  is  a  hostile  or  threat- 
ening crowd,  the  guard  should  be  reinforced  as  rapidly 
as  men  reach  the  armory  and  are  uniformed  and  armed, 
until  it  becomes  sufficiently  strong  to  hold  the  surround- 
ings of  the  armory  up  to  the  time  that  the  command 


^ 


314 

has  fully  assembled,  made  all  of  its  preparations,  and 
is  ready  to  move  out. 

In  case  the  "  call  to  arms  "  is  unexpected  and  unpro- 
vided for,  the  police  authorities  should  immediately 
send  to  every  armory  in  the  city  detachments  of  police 
to  protect  them,  as  above  described,  until  a  sufficient 
number  of  soldiers  have  arrived  and  can  be  posted  to 
relieve  them. 

In  all  cities  there  should  be  two  methods  of  calling 
out  the  troops :  one,  by  verbal  orders  sent  to  the  men 
individually  through  the  non-commissioned  officers  of 
their  respective  squads ;  the  other,  by  a  prescribed  sig- 
nal on  the  fire-alarm  bells,  to  be  used  in  cases  of  sudden 
emergency. 

Uniforms,  arms,  and  equipments  should  always  be 
kept  irj  the  armories ;  otherwise  individual  men  in  uni- 
form, attempting  to  reach  their  armories,  would  be 
waylaid  and  forcibly  detained  or  killed  by  the  rioters. 
Fatigue  or  field  dress  should  invariably  be  assumed 
for  street-riot  duty,  and  the  commanding  officer  at  the 
armory  will  indicate  whether  blankets,  overcoats,  haver- 
sacks, canteens,  knapsacks,  or  which  of  them  are  to  be 
worn. 

Every  man  suddenly  summoned  for  duty  should 
take  with  him  from  home  sufficient  bread  and  meat  for 
one  day's  rations,  in  order  to  provide  against  the  con- 
tingency of  lack  of  time  for  the  commissary  officers  to 
provide  for  feeding  them  immediately. 

After  the  troops  have  been  assembled  in  the  armory 
they  should  be  minutely  inspected  to  see  that  every 
man  is  thoroughly  equipped  and  every  rifle  in  perfect 
order.  Ball  cartridges  should  then  be  issued  to  the 
men.  The  commanding  officer  should  also  outline  to 
his  officers  the  nature  of  the  duty  he  has  been  ordered 
to  perform  and  the  manner  in  which  he  intends  to  ex- 


315 

ecute  his  orders,  and  should  give  to  his  men  some  gen- 
eral instructions  and  cautions.  A  capable  officer  and 
such  number  of  men  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  re- 
quire should  then  be  detailed  to  remain  at  the  armory. 
If  a  guard  has  been  maintained  at  a  distance  from 
the  armory,  as  indicated,  there  will  be  no  difficulty  in 
moving  the  command  out  of  the  armory  and  forming 
it  on  the  street;  but  if  such  a  guard  has  not  been 
maintained,  or  has  been  forced  by  a  hostile  crowd 
that  shows  a  disposition  to  dispute  the  egress  of  the 
troops  from  the  armory ,  there  are  many  expedients  which 
will  suggest  themselves  to  any  officer  by  which  he  may 
force  the  passage.  Do  not  temporize  with  such  a  crowd 
or  seek  to  evade  it  by  some  back-alley  egress.  Con- 
front  the  danger  at  once,  as  determined  action  and  a 
severe  lesson  to  the  would-be  rioters  at  this  juncture 
may  prevent  much  further  trouble. 

STREET   TACTICS. 

You  have  been  accustomed  to  apply  the  word 
"  tactics  "  to  your  drill  book.  This  application  of  the 
word  is  erroneous,  and  it  is  therefore  necessary  for  me 
to  say  that  on  this  branch  of  my  subject  I  shall  use  the 
word  in  its  proper  and  broader  significance,  in  which  it 
may  be  defined  as  "  the  art  of  handling  troops  in  the 
presence  of  an  enemy,"  or  the  "disposition  and  move- 
ments of  troops  for  attack  and  defense  when  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy." 

The  maneuvering  of  troops  in  the  streets  of  a  city 
requires  some  special  formations  not  prescribed  in  the 
drill  books  for  maneuvering  troops  in  the  open  field. 
Many  systems  have  been  devised  and  advocated,  but 
all  of  them  are  too  complicated.  It  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  the  troops  most  likely  to  be  used  in  sup- 
pressing riots  will  be  "  raw  troops,"  unaccustomed  to 


316 

vi  scenes  of  dangerous  excitement  or  to  the  sensation  of 
being  fired  on.  To  attempt  complicated  maneuvers 
with  such  troops  would  result  in  confusion  and  conse- 
quent disaster.  There  should  be  only  one  formation 
used  in  street-riot  duty,  and  that  the  most  simple 
possible,  both  in  its  ployment  and  deployment. 

The  system  of  street  drill  devised  by  the  late  General 
W.  H.  Brownell,  of  the  New  York  National  Guard, 
has  heretofore  been  the  most  generally  adopted  and 
accepted  system.     His  system  may  be  briefly  outlined 

\J  as  having  two  principal  formations.  His  first  forma- 
tion is  a  hollow  square,  with  the  front  and  rear  sub- 
divisions extending  the  width  of  the  street,  from  build- 
ing line  to  building  line;  the  flank  subdivisions  in 
column  of  fours,  and  with  sharpshooters  in  the  line 
of  file-closers  inside  the  square.  His  second  forma- 
tion is  simply  a  column  of  divisions  with  the  division 
fronts  extended  or  contracted  so  as  to  exactly  cover 
the  width  of  the  street  from  building  line  to  build- 
ing line,  and  with  sharpshooters  on  the  flanks  in  the 
intervals  between  divisions.  The  methods  of  chang- 
ing from  one  of  those  formations  to  the  other,  or  of 
assuming  them  either  from  column  of  fours  or  from 
column  of  companies,  and  of  extending  or  contract- 
ing the  front,  are  minutely  prescribed.  The  forma-, 
tion  of  a  hollow  square  he  describes  as  "  simply  pre- 
cautionary for  defense  while  marching  to  the  scene  of 
trouble,  and  prepared  for  any  emergency."  The  other 
formation,  an  ordinary  column  of  divisions,  he  calls 
the  "  assaulting  or  fighting  formation."  I  have  already 
stated  my  objection  to  having  more  than  one  formation 
for  street-riot  duty  ;  but  if  we  should  admit  that  two  or 
more  formations,  with  all  the  complicated  maneuvers 
arising  from  them,  might  be  desirable,  it  is  impossible 
to  conceive  on  what  reasons  the  application  of  the  two 


317 

formations  above  described  have  been  based.  It  seems  to 
me  that  their  appUcation  should  have  been  reversed,  and 
the  hollow  square  made  the  fighting  formation,  as  it  is 
unquestionably  the  stronger  formation,  either  for  defense 
or  offense.  A  radical  defect  in  both  formations  is  that 
in  one  the  sharpshooters  are  inside  the  square,  and  in 
the  otlier  inside  the  flanks  of  the  column — in  both 
cases  about  as  inappropriate  as  would  be  a  skirmish 
line  in  rear  of  a  line  of  battle.  The  system  further 
prescribes  that,  being  in  column  of  fighting  order 
and  pressing  the  mob  back  closely,  on  reaching  inter- 
vening streets  the  subdivisions  of  the  leading  division 
will  vigorously  execute  the  ''  right  and  left  turn  "  re- 
spectively, and  thereby  sweep  away  and  detach  from 
the  mob  its  front  ranks  and  drive  them  down  the  side 
streets.  Even  theoretically  this  seems  rather  a  weak 
maneuver,  and  I  would  not  hesitate  to  predict  that  if 
attempted  would  result  in  disaster,  and  that  the  sub- 
divisions making  the  "  turn,"  with  their  flanks  exposed 
to  the  pressure  of  the  mob,  would  be  those  swept  away. 

Another  system  of  street  drill  has  been  published  by 
Major  E.  G.  Sprowl,  of  the  California  National  Guard. 
Like  Brownell's  tactics,  it  shows  infinite  care  and  prac- 
tical knowledge  in  the  most  minute  details  of  drill; 
in  fact,  it  is  most  elaborate  in  details.  Xt  provides 
for  "  street-marching  order,"  "  double-column  order," 
"street-tcorner  order,"  "street-fighting  order,"  and  "  build- 
ing-attack order." 

These  and  all  similar  systems  of  street  drill  are  ex- 
cellent studies  for  professional  soldiers  in  the  methods 
of  attack  and  defense  of  towns  and  villages,  and  veteran 
troops  could  probably  be  maneuvered  by  them  under 
severe  fire,  but  they  are  too  complicated  to  use  in  hand- 
ling militia  the  first  time  it  is  brought  under  fire  or 
into  the  pres3nce  of  danger. 


318 

I  do  not  claim  any  originality  for  the  street  drill  I 
have  prescribed  for  you,  and  it  may  have  even  more 
faults  than  I  have  pointed  out  in  other  systems.  I 
am,  however,  somewhat  confirmed  in  my  views  by 
the  fact  that  while  they  were  in  manuscript,  and  had 
not  been  made  public,  the  U.  S.  Army  Tactical  Board 
adopted  almost  identically  the  same  system. 

In  our  street  drill  I  have  prescribed  but  one  forma- 
tion, and  that  is  a  modification  of  Brownell's  hollow 
square  formation,  and  have  made  a  different  application 
of  it.  The  modifications  consist  in  giving  the  square 
whatever  front  the  number  of  men  in  the  leading  com- 
pany might  happen  to  give  it,  except  that  in  no  case 
should  the  front  exceed  the  width  between  curb-lines  of 
the  street,  and  in  placing  the  sharpshooters  oustide  the 
square  instead  of  inside.  My  reasons  for  these  modifi- 
cations are:  that  it  makes  no  difference  whether  the 
front  of  the  squar§  reaches  the  building  lines  or  not, 
for  it  may  be  extended  from  the  flanks  of  the  leading 
and  rear  subdivisions  to  the  building  lines  by  sharp- 
shooters, who  would  then  be  available  and  in  position 
for  effective  work  ;  that  the  front  of  the  square  should 
not  extend  beyond  the  curb-lines  for  the  reason  that 
trees,  lamp-posts,  projecting  steps,  areas,  fences,  and 
other  obstructions  would  often  make  it  impracticable 
to  march  the  flanks  of  the  square  in  column  of  fours  on 
the  sidewalk ;  that  the  sharpshooters,  being  placed  out- 
side the  square,  would  naturally  occupy  the  sidewalk, 
and  what  would  prove  obstructions  to  a  column  of 
fours  would  serve  as  a  cover  for  them,  and  they  could 
more  readily  cover  the  windows  on  the  side  of  the 
street  opposite  to  them  or  reinforce  the  sharpshooters 
in  front.  The  formation  I  have  described  obviates  all 
maneuvering  or  change  of  formation ;  it  can  be  used 
first,  last,  and  all  the  time ;  it  is  the  best  formation  in 


319 

which  to  march  through  riotous  districts,  as  it  is  ready 
for  instant  work;  it  is  tlie  best  for  fighting,  as  it  is 
equally  effective  for  attack  or  defense,  and  is  equally 
'  ready  on  every  side  for  either.  Intersecting  streets  or 
open  parks,  on  one  or  both  sides,  are  easily  provided 
for  by  wheeling  the  flanking  columns  of  the  square 
into  line ;  and  above  all,  the  formation  having  been 
once  taken,  there  is  no  liability  of  the  troops  being 
thrown  into  confusion  by  attempts  to  execute  compli- 
cated maneuvers. 

Troops  on  riot  duty  should  move  through  the  streets 
without  music  or  colors.  If  the  riot  is  local,  and  a  con- 
siderable distance  from  the  armory,  the  troops  should 
be  moved  by  the  least  frequented  streets  and  in  column 
of  fours,  so  that  they  will  not  interrupt  public  traffic  or 
create  excitement.  If,  however,  the  riot  is  a  general 
uprising,  the  troops  should  be  moved  upon  whatever 
streets  military  policy  may  indicate,  and  in  the  forma- 
tion of  hollow  square,  as  described. 

Sharpshooters  should  be  considered  as  detached  from 
their  companies,  and  should  be  placed  under  the  imm  e- 
diate  command  of  an  inspector  of  rifle  practice,  who 
will  receive  his  instructions  and  orders  direct  from  the 
commanding  officer. 

The  essential  quality  in  troops  that  are  to  be  used 
against  a  mob  is  fire  discipline,  and  in  this  quality  the 
troops  of  the  National  Guard  are  sadly  lacking.  You 
should  make  it  the  most  important  feature  of  your  in- 
struction and  drills.  Firing  must  be  completely  under 
the  control  of  the  commanding  officer,  both  as  to  its  be- 
ginning and  ceasing.  A  single  shot  prematurely  fired  is 
an  error ;  a  single  life  unnecessarily  taken  is  a  crime. 
With  the  exception  of  the  sharpshooters,  the  fire  should 
be  by  volleys  and  delivered  by  ranks.  As  the  men  are 
trained  at  much  longer  range  than  would  be  used  in  the 


320 

streets,  the  fire  should  invariably  be  delivered  kneeling, 
to  avoid  the  tendency  to  fire  too  high.  It  is  unneces- 
sary to  say  that  blank  cartridges  and  harmless  volleys 
over  the  heads  of  a  mob  should  be  absolutely  prohibited. 

The  sharpshooters  should  fire  individually  and  only 
as  directed  by  their  commanding  officer.  The  use  of 
sharpshooters  and  their  desultory  firing  makes  it  still 
more  essential  that  the  body  of  the  troops  should  be 
held  under  stringent  fire  discipline. 

Having  considered  the  modes  of  forming  and  moving 
troops,  we  may  now  properly  consider  the  modes  of 
dispersing  or  attacking  a  mob  when  finally  brought  in 
contact  with  it. 

If  the  mob  is  in  an  open  street,  without  barricades, 
and  does  not  occupy  the  houses  on  either  side  of  it, 
while  its  offensive  strength  is  reduced  to  its  limited  front 
its  defensive  strength  must  be  measured  by  the  depth  of 
the  surging  mass  of  impassioned  rioters  constituting  the 
body  of  it.  The  appearance  of  a  strong  military  force 
O  on  its  front  may  induce  the  leaders  of  a  mob  to  listen 
and  heed  the  demands  to  disperse,  or  to  endeavor  to 
escape  from  the  threatening  Gatling  guns  and  levelled 
rifles  confronting  them.  The  dense  crowd  in  the  rear, 
hearing  and  seeing  nothing  of  what  is  going  on  in  front, 
are  heedless  of  danger  and  pressing  forward,  so  that  it 
is  impossible  for  the  front  to  give  way,  whether  desirous 
or  forced  to  do  so.  Even  after  a  deadly  volley  is  fired 
by  the  troops,  the  rear  of  the  mob  is  still  unawed  and 
presses  forward. 

The  troops  should  in  no  case  be  brought  into  imme- 
diate contact  with  such  a  mob.  Bayonets  and  "  butts 
to  the  front "  would  be  of  no  avail,  as  in  such  hand-to- 
hand  fighting  the  troops  would  quickly  be  overwhelmed 
by  mere  weight  of  numbers.  The  offensive  and  de- 
fensive power  of  the  inferior  number  of  troops  rests  in 


321 

discipline  and  in  the  bullet;  two  hundred  troops  in 
an  ordinary  street  would  hold  the  defensive  against 
a  mob  of  any  size  as  effectually  as  two  thousand.  The 
commanding  officer  should  therefore  halt  his  troops  a 
suitable  distance  from  the  mob,  determine  what  number 
may  be  necessary  to  hold  the  mob  in  check,  and  divide 
the  balance  into  two  detacTiments  to  move  down  the 
streets  parallel  to  the  one  held  by  the  mob  on  each  of 
its  flanks,  with  instructions  to  come  in  on  the  flanks 
and,  if  possible,  the  rear  of  the  mob  by  alternate  side 
streets,  so  as  not  to  fire  on  each  other.  The  flanking 
and  rear  detachments  should  begin  their  work  first,  and, 
when  they  have  disintegrated  the  mass  of  the  mob  so 
that  its  front  may  be  able  to  give  way,  a  determined  ad- 
vance or  a  single  volley  on  its  front  may  quickly  termi- 
nate the  work,  and  with  much  less  loss  of  life  than  would 
otherwise  be  entailed.  An  example  of  the  value  and 
effectiveness  of  this  method  of  attacking  a  mob  occurred 
in  the  draft  riots  in  New  York  city  in  1863.  On  the 
second  day  of  the  nots  an  immense  mob  moved  down 
Broadway  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  attacking  police 
headquarters.  Less  than  two  hundred  policemen  were 
available  to  meet  the  mob,  and  they  were  placed  under 
the  command  of  Sergeant  Carpenter,  with  the  signifi- 
cant order  to  "  make  no  arrests,"  and  were  sent  out  as 
a  "  forlorn  hope."  The  fight  is  thus  described  :  "  They 
moved  down  Bleecker  street  towards  Broadway.  As 
they  turned  into  the  latter  street,  only  a  block  and  a 
half  away,  they  saw  the  mob,  which  filled  the  street  as 
far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  moving  t'lmultuously  for- 
ward. ^  *  ^  The  less  than  two  hundred  policemen, 
compact  and  firm,  now  halted,  while  Carpenter  detached 
two  companies  of  fifty  each  up  the  parallel  streets  to 
the  right  and  left  as  far  as  Fourth  street.  Coming  down 
this  street  from  both  directions,  they  were  to  strike  the 
21 


322 

mob  on  both  flanks  at  the  same  time  he  charged  them 
in  front.  *  *  *  The  mob,  just  before  so  confident 
and  bold,  quailed  in  terror  and  would  have  broke  and 
fled  at  once  but  for  the  mass  behind,  which  kept  bear- 
ing down  on  them.  This,  however,  soon  gave  away 
before  the  side  attacks,  and  the  'panic  that  followed  *  *  * 
^  It  was  a  great  victory  and  decisive  of  all  future  contests." 

STREET   STRATEGY. 

In  the  sense  in  which  used  in  connection  with  the 
operations  of  War,  strategy  has  but  a  limited  application 
to  the  problems  arising  from  street-riot  duty,  and  none 
whatever  in  what  I  have  designated  as  local  riots.  In 
general  riots  the  same  principles  that  govern  the  move- 
ments and  disposition  of  large  armies  in  the  field  may 
be  applied,  with  such  modifications  as  the  contracted 
field  of  operations  would  naturally  suggest. 

If  we  consider  strategy  to  be  ''  the  general  disposition 
and  movement  of  troops  with  the  view  of  compassing 
the  enemy's  overthrow  under  conditions  that  will  secure 
the  most  decisive  results,"  we  may  accept  the  orders 
issued  by  General  St.  Arnaud  to  his  troops  during  the 
riots  in  Paris  in  1851  as  the  best  instruction  we  have  on 
the  subject :  "  Concentrate  the  troops  in  masses,  care  for 
them,  feed  them  well,  keep  them  from  contact  with  the 
people,  withdraw  the  too  feeble  posts,  dispense  with 
patrols,  allow  barricades  to  be  constructed ;  then,  the 
moment  for  action  being  carefully  chosen,  attack  unex- 
pectedly with  compact  force  and  crush  all  resistance." 

In  the  few  cases  of  general  riots  we  have  had  in  this 
country  the  common  error  has  been  using  small  bodies 
of  troops  in  attempts  to  quell  disorder  at  many  scat- 
tered points.  Detached  combats  without  decisive  or 
material  results  exhaust  the  troops  and  encourage  the 
rioters.     During  the  first  days  of  the  "  draft  riots  "  in 


New  York  city  in  1863  the  small  available  force  of 
military  and  police  were  completely  exhausted  by- being 
sent  in  small  detachments  to  every  point  from  which 
rioting  or  disorder  was  reported.  A  crowd  dispersed,  a 
few  men  killed,  the  troops  withdrawn,  and  the  rioters 
immediately  reoccupying  the  ground  were  the  only  re- . 
suits  gained. 

In  all  large  cities  the  strategic  points  in  the  city 
should  be  determined,  studied,  and  known  beforehand, 
and  in  case  of  a  general  uprising  the  troops  should  be 
concentrated  at  these  points  as  rapidly  as  they  can  be  as- 
sembled, instead  of  being  scattered  throughout  the  city 
wherever  rioting  may  happen  to  be  going  on  at  the 
moment.  By  strategic  points  I  mean  those  points  by 
which,  or  from  which,  the  various  districts  of  the  city 
can  be  completely  isolated  from  each  other.  These 
points  having  been  thus  occupied,  a  simultaneous  move- 
ment, with  each  part  supporting  the  others,  and  an  over- 
whelming attack  on  the  most  important  stronghold  of 
the  rioters  would  probably  crush  the  uprising  com- 
pletely or  make  further  operations  simply  similar  to  the 
pursuit  and  breaking  up  of  a  defeated  and  demoralized 
army. 

It  is  a  common  error  to  regard  a  street  as  a  defile,  and 
to  attempt  to  apply  the  rules  of  war  relative  to  the  at- 
tack and  passage  of  defiles.  In  determining  the  selec- 
tion of  strategic  points  and  the  movements  of  troops  in 
a  general  uprising,  a  city  should  rather  be  regarded  as  a 
broken  or  mountainous  country,  with  innumerable  de- 
files, which  make  parallel,  flanking,  and  rear  movements 
possible  and  easy. 

In  occupying  the  strategic  points  selected  it  is  well  to    . 
keep  the  mass  of  the  troops  concealed  as  much  as  prac- 
ticable until  the  time  for  action  arrives,  so  that,  their 
sudden  appearance  may  be  an  overwhelming  surprise.  ^ 


324 

It  is  a  commonly  accepted  theory  that  armories  in 
cities  should  be  constructed  as  fortresses.  If  the  ar- 
mories were  located  at  strategic  points,  this  theory  might 
be  correct ;  but  as  they  are  generally  located  by  the  acci- 
dent of  convenience  or  value  of  ground,  I  can  perceive 
no  practical  or  military  reason  in  such  theory.  The 
armories  of  militia  are  simply  places  of  meeting,  and 
repositories  for  arms  and  equipments. 

Rioters  have  no  incentive  or  desire  to  attack  or  be- 
siege armories;  their  plunder  lies  elsewhere.  They 
might  attempt  to  prevent  the  egress  of  troops  assembled 
in  an  armory,  but  in  such  event  a  fortress  would  be  of 
no  more  account  than  an  ordinary  building. 

The  only  attempt  that  rioters  would  make  on  an 
armory  would  be  secretly  and  suddenly,  with  a  view  of 
obtaining  or  destroying  the  arms  in  it  before  the  troops 
assembled.  Against  such  an  attempt  a  fortress  guarded 
by  a  janitor  would  be  no  more  secure  than  any  ordi- 
nary building.  If  the  militia  are  in  the  armory,  with 
the  arms  in  their  hands,  the  rioters  will  not  attack 
the  armory  with  a  view  of  obtaining  the  arms.  If  the 
militia  have  secured  their  arms  and  left  the  armory,  it  is 
of  no  more  use  to  the  rioters  than  any  other  unoccupied 
building.  If  the  rioters  were  defeated  in  the  open  streets 
and  could  reach  these  deserted  fortress  armories  before 
the  troops  returned  to  them,  the  tables  might  be  turned 
and  necessitate  the  troops  besieging  them. 

The  militia  are  supposed  to  act  on  the  offensive  and 
not  to  shut  themselves  up  in  armories  to  act  on  the  de- 
fensive. Their  offensive  operations  should  not  be  weak- 
ened by  the  thought  that  they  have  convenient  and  safe 
places  within  which  to  retire  if  they  are  defeated. 
This  point  is  well  illustrated  by  the  disastrous  results 
that  followed  from  the  militia  allowing  themselves  to  be 
shut  up  in  the  "  round-house  "  at  Pittsburg  during  the 


325 

riots  of  1877.  In  case  of  defeat  they  should  be  with- 
drawn to  public  parks  and  open  spaces,  in  which  they 
can  be  concentrated,  easily  defend  themselves  on  all 
sides,  and  be  in  position  to  resume  the  offensive  at  the 
first  favorable  opportunity. 

An  armory  should  more  properly  be  regarded  simply 
as  a  secure  place  to  keep  arms,  and  that  security  can 
best  be  obtained  by  heavy  iron  gratings  to  doors  and 
windows,  and  by  keeping  the  arms  in  a  special  room 
with  heavy  brick  walls,  floor,  and  ceiling,  and  double 
steel  doors,  constructed  with  a  view  of  resisting  the 
efforts  of  rioters  sufficiently  long  to  allow  the  alarm 
to  be  given,  instead  of  keeping  the  arms  in  ornamental 
and  insecure  racks  in  the  open  drill-hall. 

In  all  riots  the  commanding  officer  of  the  military  force 
should  keep  himself  constantly  advised  of  the  move- 
ments and  purposes  of  the  rioters  by  means  of  detec- 
tives, or  scouts  in  civilian's  clothing. 

It  may  be  assumed  that  the  civil  authorities  before 
calling  for  military  aid  will  have  provided  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  gas  and  electric  light  works,  water  works, 
fire  department  houses,  telegraph  and  telephone  lines ; 
will  have  closed  all  liquor  saloons,  and  will  have  closed 
and  guarded  all  gun  stores.  It  should  be  the  first  care 
of  the  military  commander  to  ascertain  if  these  pre- 
cautions have  been  taken,  and  if  not  already  provided 
for,  he  should  suggest  that  the  civil  force  he  relieves  be 
immediately  disposed  for  that  purpose  ;  or,  if  the  civil 
authorities  are  inert  and  inefficient,  should  immediately 
assign  the  necessary  military  force  to  do  it. 

When  military  force  has  been  called  to  aid  the  civil 
authorities,  the  troops  should  never  assume  the  functions 
of  the  'police  unless  the  civil  authority  is  completely 
paralyzed.  The  functions  of  the  police  and  the  mili- 
tary are  entirely  distinct,  and  should  be  kept  so.     As  a 


326 

rule,  it  may  be  said  that  the  troops  should  on  no  occa- 
sion act  as  auxiliary  to  the  police,  while  the  police  should 
constantly  act  as  auxiliary  to  the  military  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  arrests  or  taking  into  custody  rioters  that 
have  been  seized  by  or  surrendered  to  the  military. 

ATTACK  or   BARRICADES. 

If  the  rioters  instead  of  being  in  an  open  street, 
have  been  forced  into  or  taken  a  purely  defensive  atti- 
tude, and  entrench  themselves  by  means  of  barricades, 
a  direct  attack  on  such  barricades  should  never  be  at- 
tempted until  all  other  methods  of  capturing  them  have 
been  tried  and  failed,  or  are  evidently  useless  to  attempt. 

A  thorough  reconnoissance  of  the  surroundings  of  the 
barricaded  position  should  be  made  to  determine  if  it 
is  possible  to  attack  it  on  the  rear  or  flanks.  It  is 
difficult  to  conceive  of  any  position  in  which  this  would 
not  be  possible ;  for,  if  the  situation  demanded  such  ex- 
treme methods,  houses  could  be  destroyed  to  open  a 
direct  access  to  the  flank  of  the  position.  In  some  cases 
the  position  might  be  such  that,  if  the  number  of  troops 
were  sufficient  to  warrant  it,  the  whole  entrenched 
position  could  be  cut  off  and  isolated  while  the  work 
of  suppressing  the  riot  in  other  portions  of  the  city  pro- 
ceeded. 

If,  however,  all  other  methods  fail  and  a  direct  attack 
on  a  barricade  becomes  necessar}^,  artillery  is  indispen- 
sable, and  the  rapid  fire  or  revolving  cannon,  capable  of 
an  unremitting  fire  of  small  shells,  are  best  adapted  to 
the  work.  The  artillery  should  be  run  as  far  to  the 
front  as  practicable  and  supported  by  the  infantry  des- 
ignated to  make  the  assault,  who  in  the  meantime 
should  be  kept  as  much  under  cover  as  possible.  The 
artillerymen  should  be  protected  from  the  fire  of  rioters 
occupying  overlooking  houses  by  epaulements  impro- 


327 

vised  from  the  nearest  available  material.  Sharpshoot- 
ers of  the  infantry,  acting  as  skirmishers,  should  prevent 
any  return  fire  from  the  barricade  and  any  attempt  by 
its  defenders  to  repair  breaches  made  in  it.  Suitable 
forces  of  infantry  should  then  start  from  the  first  avail- 
able house  on  each  side  of  the  street  and  fight  their  way 
from  house  to  house  until  they  reach  the  houses  flanking 
and  overlooking  the  barricade.  When  they  have  reached 
that  point  the  infantry  that  has  been  held  in  support  of 
the  artillery  should  make  a  direct  assault  on  the  barri- 
cade, unless  it  shall  have  been  already  abandoned. 

When  barricades  have  been  carried,  the  pioneers  or 
engineer  troops  should  immediately  remove  or  destroy 
them. 

An  enterprising  commander,  with  a  very  small  force 
of  courageous  men,  may  surprise  and  capture  a  barri- 
cade in  the  night  by  watching  the  opportunities  ofi'ered 
through  want  of  discipline  and  proper  guard  duty  on  the 
part  of  its  defenders,  as  they  might  generally  be  caught 
in  a  condition  of  drunken  stupor. 

ATTACK   AND   DEFENSE   OF   HOUSES. 

If  rioters  have  occupied  houses,  the  first  question  in 
the  mind  of  the  commander  of  a  military  force  should 
be  whether  to  avoid,  to  isolate,  or  to  attack  them ;  and 
an  attack  for  the  purpose  of  dislodging  the  rioters  should 
not  be  made  unless  imperatively  necessary. 

The  houses  may  have  been  occupied  by  the  rioters 
without  forethought  or  plan,  simply  on  the  impulse  of 
the  moment,  as  a  vantage  ground  frorti  which  to  impede 
or  annoy  the  passage  of  troops  through  a  street  when  the 
rioters  are  not  in  sufficient  force  to  resist  their  passage 
in  the  open  street.  In  such  cases,  if  troops  are  under 
orders  to  proceed  to  a  designated  point  for  a  specific  pur- 
pose, it  would  generally  be  best  to  avoid  these  locations 


328 

by  taking  a  circuitous  route.  If,  however,  houses  so 
occupied  would  remain  as  a  menace  in  the  rear  of  the 
advancing  troops,  or  as  an  obstacle  to  their  retreat  in  case 
of  disaster,  it  would  be  better  to  isolate  or  blockade  the 
square  in  which  the  houses  are  located,  so  that  the  occu- 
pants would  be  held  in  a  trap  from  which  escape  would 
be  impossible,  and  in  which  they  might  be  held  and 
dealt  with  at  the  proper  time. 

If  houses  have  been  occupied  as  a  place  of  refuge  and 
defense  by  rioters  who  have  been  defeated  in  the  open 
streets,  or  under  the  directions  of  competent  leaders  as 
flank  defenses  of  barricaded  positions  or  vantage  grounds 
for  fighting ;  or  if,  for  any  reason,  it  becomes  necessary 
to  dislodge  the  rioters,  the  attack  on  such  houses  must 
be  made  systematically  and  with  thorough  preparation 
of  all  the  appliances  needed  to  make  an  attack  suc- 
cessful. 

A  direct  attack  on  a  house  that  has  been  barricaded 
for  defense  should  never  be  made  unless  it  is  demon- 
strated that  all  other  methods  would  be  useless,  and 
when  made  should  be  preceded  by  artillery  fire  that  will 
destroy  the  interior  defenses.  The  better  method  of  at- 
tack, however,  is  the  indirect. 

If  the  houses  occupied  by  the  rioters  are  part  of  a 
block  of  houses,  the  troops  should  take  possession  of  the 
first  house  in  the  block  not  so  occupied.  If  the  roofs  are' 
flat,  the  troops  should  attack  the  first  occupied  house  by 
way  of  the  roof,  gaining  access  through  the  scuttles  or 
by  cutting  holes  in  the  roof.  If  the  roofs  are  steep,  ac- 
cess should  be  gained  by  breaking  through  the  walls  in 
the  top  story.  It  is  infinitely  better  to  fight  downwards 
in  a  house  than  to  fight  upwards,  and  the  latter  should 
not  be  attempted  if  there  is  any  possible  way  of  avoid- 
ing it.  Hand  grenades  or  light  dynamite  bombs  dropped 
down  the  roof  scuttles  or  chimneys  are  good  prelimi- 


329 

naries  to  the  descent  of  the  troops.  After  getting  into  a 
house  no  pause  should  be  allowed  in  the  attack ;  the  de- 
fenders should  be  followed  closely  from  room  to  room  and 
floor  to  floor  until  resistance  ceases  or  they  are  driven 
from  the  lower  floor  into  the  hands  of  the  troops  in 
the  streets.  The  first  house  in  the  block  having  been 
cleared,  the  next  adjoining  should  be  attacked  in  the 
same  manner,  and  so  on  until  the  whole  block  is  cleared. 

If  all  of  the  houses  in  a  block  are  occupied  by  the  riot- 
ers and  it  becomes  necessary  to  make  a  direct  attack  on 
one  of  them  in  order  to  obtain  a  foothold  from  which  to 
attack  the  others  in  the  method  I  have  described,  the 
mode  of  attack  must  be  determined  by  circumstances. 

If  the  houses  on  both  sides  of  the  street  are  occupied 
by  rioters  it  may  be  found  best  to  make  the  attack  on 
the  rear  of  the  house,  as  less  likely  to  be  well  guarded 
and  protected.  In  such  case,  if  the  houses  on  the 
parallel  street  are  not  occupied  by  the  rioters,  sharp- 
shooters should  be  stationed  in  their  rear  windows  to 
cover  the  attacking  party  while  they  are  forcing  en- 
trance into  the  opposite  house. 

In  the  same  way  if  the  rioters  only  occupy  the  houses 
on  one  side  of  a  street  and  it  becomes  necessary  to  make 
the  attack  on  the  front  of  a  house,  it  may  be  covered  by 
sharpshooters  from  the  windows  of  the  houses  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  street,  and  the  detachment  of  troops 
detailed  for  the  attack  should,  if  possible,  approach  from 
the  right  and  keep  close  to  the  building  line,  for  the 
reason  that  the  defenders  would  be  obliged  to  lean  far 
out  of  the  windows  to  fire  upon  them,  and  would  thereby 
expose  a  large  part  of  their  own  bodies  to  the  fire  of 
the  sharpshooters.  To  force  an  entrance  into  a  house 
under  these  conditions,  small  bags  of  gunpowder  nailed 
against  barricaded  doors  or  windows,  and  exploded,  will 
be  found  very  eff'ective. 


330 

Artillery,  however,  is  the  best  instrument  with  which 
to  open  passage  into  a  block  of  houses  occupied  by  riot- 
ers. A  foothold  once  gained  in  one  house  of  a  blockj 
the  balance  is  easy. 

The  methods  of  defending  buildings  entrusted  to  your 
care  are  as  important  for  you  to  study  as  the  methods 
of  attacking  buildings  occupied  by  rioters.  What  I  have 
outlined  to  you  as  methods  of  attack  may  be  suggestive 
of  the  proper  methods  of  defense. 

I  would  assert,  as  a  general  principle,  that  no  build- 
ing should  be  defended  from  within  itself  until  all  its 
outlying  defenses  have  been  forced.  The  first  defense 
should  be  outside  of  and  at  a  considerable  distance  from 
the  building.  The  building  should  be  regarded  solely 
as  the  citadel  of  the  defense,  the  last  refuge  of  the  de- 
fenders. 

Given  the  defense  of  an  important  building,  the  de- 
fenders should  erect  and  occupy  barricades  on  all  pos- 
sible avenues  of  approach  to  the  building,  and  at  such 
distances  that  neither  dynamite  nor  fire  could  be  used 
against  the  building  by  the  rioters;  these  barricades 
may  be  designated  the  outer  line  of  defense.  All  sur- 
rounding buildings  that  command  the  fronts  and 
entrances  to  the  building  should  be  simultaneously 
occupied  as  a  second  or  interior  line  of  defense.  In 
anticipation  of  the  possibility  of  both  the  outer  and 
inner  lines  of  defense  being  carried,  a  reserve  of  troops 
should  be  posted  within  the  building  with  instructions 
to  prepare  it  for  resisting  assault  and  to  protect  the  re- 
treat of  the  outlying  troops  if  they  should  be  forced  to 
seek  refuge  in  it. 

In  preparing  a  building  to  resist  assault,  as  many 
entrances  as  possible  should  be  closed,  and  all  the  outer 
doors  and  windows  of  the  basement  and  first  story  care- 
fully barricaded  with  furniture,   rolls  of  carpet,  mat- 


331 

tresses,  piles  of  books,  or  any  available  material.  Loojd- 
holes  should  invariably  be  made  so  high  that  the  assail- 
ants cannot  use  them  from  the  outside,  boxes  and  chairs 
being  provided  to  enable  the  defenders  to  use  them  from 
the  inside.  Supplies  of  food,  water,  means  of  lighting, 
and  facilities  for  extinguishing  fire  should  be  provided. 
If  the  building  is  accessible  from  adjoining  buildings, 
the  roof  should  be  occupied,  and  partition  walls  on  each 
story  loopholed.  If  the  situation  seems  to  demand  ex- 
treme precautions  for  defense,  the  stairways  should  be 
demolished  and  ladders  substituted,  all  interior  doors 
and  partitions  loopholed,  and  long  halls  or  passage-ways 
barricaded.  If  the  building  is  assaulted  the  defense 
must  be  obstinate,  as  defeat  would  probably  mean  an- 
nihilation. 

♦ 

DEFENSE   OF   RAILWAYS. 

The  defense  of  railways  running  through  insurgent 
districts  may  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  rules  of  war. 
The  embarking,  movement,  and  debarking  of  troops, 
covering  bridges  and  culverts  from  destruction,  and  pro- 
tecting tracks  from  being  torn  up  do  not  properlj^  come 
within  the  scope  of  this  lecture.  The  defense  of  rail- 
road property  within  a  city,  especially  when  its  tracks 
traverse  the  city  or  penetrate  nearly  to  its  center,  is  a 
difficult  problem,  and  the  only  one  that  we  need  now 
consider. 

Passenger  stations  and  freight  depots  in  a  city  may 
be  protected  and  defended  in  the  same  way  that  I  have 
described  for  the  defense  of  other  buildings.  The  rolling 
stock  of  the  railroad,  and  especially  the  loaded  freight 
cars,  should  be  collected  at  one  point  and  placed  in 
a  solid  mass  on  parallel  tracks,  in  which  condition  they 
may  be  treated  as  a  building  and  defended  in  the  same 
manner — that  is,  the  first  defense  should  be  at  a  distance 


332 

from  the  mass  of  cars.  In  parking  the  cars,  open  or 
"  flat  "  cars  should  be  placed  on  the  outer  tracks  and  at 
the  ends  of  each  line  of  cars,  with  bales  of  hay  or  barrels 
of  merchandise  arranged  on  them  to  constitute  a  bul- 
wark for  final  defense  against  assault. 

Keeping  the  railway  tracks  open  withm  the  limits  of 
a  city  and  preventing  their  being  tampered  with  or  de- 
stroyed should  not  be  attempted  by  guards  or  a  line  of 
sentinels.  It  may  be  better  accomplished  by  the  con- 
stant running  back  and  forth  of  a  locomotive  with  open 
cars  attached  to  its  front  and  rear,  carrying  picked  rifle- 
men and  a  strong  detachment  of  troops. 

What  I  have  already  indicated  to  you  in  regard  to  all 
street-riot  duty  is  particularly  applicable  to  railways 
and  railroad  property  within  a  city — keep  the  mob  at 
a  distance;  do  not  plant  yourselves  on,  within,  or  im- 
mediately about,  the  property  to  be  defended ;  make 
your  defense  at  such  distance  from  it  that  the  property 
cannot  be  molested  while  you  maintain  your  outer 
defense. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

You  probably  think  that  I  have  exaggerated  the 
dangers  which  threaten  our  country  from  mob  violence 
in  the  future,  and  that  I  u;ge  too  strongly  such  prepara- 
tions to  suppress  lawlessness  as  will  prevent  it  from  ever 
asserting  itself  Few  of  you  are  aware,  and  probably 
the  mass  of  unthinking  and  law-abiding  citizens  may  be 
startled  to  know,  that  within  the  last  two  years  the 
militia  have  been  called  into  service  thirty-seven  times 
in  twenty-six  different  States.  If  that  is  the  record  for  the 
last  two  years,  what  may  you  expect  in  the  future  ?LIs  it 
not  time  for  the  civil  authorities  to  study  the  causes  of 
these  outbreaks  and  to  ameliorate  the  conditions  that 
give  rise  to  them ;  and  is  it  not  time  for  the  military 


333 

authorities  to  study  the  best  methods  of  suppressing 
them  if  civil  authority  fails  to  remove  the  causes  and 
prevent  them  ?j 

The  quelling  of  riots  is  not  an  easy  matter.  Com- 
pared with  the  excitement  and  honors  of  war  against  a 
national  foe,  there  is  little  of  the  heroic  in  defending  the 
integrity  of  the  law  and  the  safety  of  property ;  and  yet 
there  is  no  duty  that  can  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  soldier  that 
is  so  vitally  important  to  the  future  of  our  country. 

In  dealing  with  a  riot  there  must  be  no  apparent 
hesitation.  vEhe  lawless  elements  that  would  reduce 
the  Republic  to  anarchy  must  be  taught  that  so  long  as 
law  exists  there  are  men  who  will  defend  and  enforce 
it,  no  matter  how  obnoxious  or  unjust  the  law  may  be ; 
and  that  those  who  forcibly  resist  it  will  be  treated  for 
the  time  not  as  American  citizens,  but  as  felons^  For- 
tunately most  mobs  in  this  country  contain  very  few 
Amercan  citizens,  and  those  few  are  generally  criminals 
and  vagabonds. 

The  questions  involved  in  street  warfare  are  declared 
by  the  ablest  French  military  writers  to  be  the  most 
difficult  problems  that  a  soldier  is  called  upon  to  solve. 

General  Molineux,  of  New  York,  says :  "  While 
every  other  branch  of  the  art  has  received  serious  and 
exhaustive  consideration,  while  marked  advancement 
has  been  made  in  military  arms  and  methods  during 
the  past  twenty  years,  the  subject  of  the  suppression  of 
street  riots  and  civil  disturbances  has  failed  to  enlist 
that  attention  which  its  importance  merits  and  de- 
mands." He  further  gives  some  valuable  suggestions 
in  regard  to  the  duties  of  officers  in  street-riot  duties, 
with  which  I  so  fully  agree  that  I  cannot  do  better  than 
quote  them  fox  your  consideration  : 

"  As  in  all  operations  of  war  the  closest  attention  is 
paid  by  commanding  officers  to  the  topography  and 


<r 


334 

characteristics  of  the  country  in  which  a  campaign  is 
conducted,  so  the  officers  of  the  National  Guard  should 
apply  themselves  to  a  close  study  of  their  respective 
cities ;  acquaint  themselves  with  diff'erent  routes  to  vari- 
ous points;  the  character  of  the  houses  and  stores  on 
those  routes ;  the  obstacles  to  be  overcome ;  the  location 
of  armories,  police  stations,  ferries,  docks  on  the  river 
front,  churches,  and  parks — important  factors,  all  in  the 
problem  of  street  warfare — so  that  they  may  know  at 
each  step  of  the  way,  by  day  t)r  by  night,  the  surround- 
ings, the  quickest  and  safest  way  to  pass  or  move  around 
obstructions,  from  what  direction  attacks  are  likely  to 
come,  and  the  most  desirable  points  at  which  to  make 
a  stand.  Accurate  personal  knowledge  of  this  kind  will 
be  found  invaluable  in  times  of  emergency." 

"  There  is  a  great  deal  in  the  way  that  soldiers,  whether 
militia  or  regulars,  are  led.  Courage  is  a  relative  attri- 
bute with  men.  It  can  be  developed  by  example,  en- 
couragement, and  tact  on  the  part  of  the  officer.  A 
cheerful,  lively  spirit  inspires  troops  when  under  fire  or 
in  difficulties,  and  soldiers  will  cheerfully  obey  an  offi- 
cer if  he  is  resolute,  understands  his  business,  and  ap- 
pears confident  of  success.  Confusing  and  contradictory 
orders  are  mischievous ;  and,  though  promptness  is  al- 
ways essential,  it  is  better  to  be  too  slow  than  too  hasty. 
Nervousness  is  not  by  any  means  lack  of  courage,  but 
it  is  a  quality  which  the  officer  must  control  in  himself; 
for,  if  communicated  to  a  body  of  troops,  it  leads  to  dis- 
order, and  sometimes  to  panic.  Many  conscientious 
officers  find  the  responsibility  weigh  heavy  upon  them 
when  friends  and  comrades  are  rapidly  falling  ;  but  it  is 
preciselvat  such  a  moment  that  the  officer  should  be 
firmest/  Let  him  plan  to  prevent  loss  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, but  in  action  the  necessity  for  it  should  no  more__^ 
aff'ect  him  than  the  wiping  out  of  figures  from  a  slate."  ^ 


335 

"  What  is  wanted  in  riots  is  a  cool,  calm  exercise  of 
common  sense,  confidence  in  one's  own  ability,  and  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  surroundings,  rather  than  an 
unreasoning  adherence  to  certain  tactical  movements. 
Tactics  are  correct  in  theory,  and  have  been  demon- 
strated so  in  practice ;  they  have  been  prepared  by  the 
best  military  talent,  in  accordance  with  certain  well  de- 
fined and  understood  principles.  But  the  circumstances 
must  decide  what  movement  is  best,  just  as  the  patient's 
symptoms  justify  the  physician  in  determining  upon 
the  remedy." 

After  all,  you  must  realize  that  whatever  time  you 
may  devote  to  the  study  of  these  problems,  the  actual 
conditions  you  may  meet  will  not  corrrespond  exactly 
to  the  problems  you  have  studied ;  but  the  training  of 
your  minds  by  such  study  will  fit  you  for  any  emergency, 
and  when  you  stand  in  the  streets  in  command  of  men 
who  represent  law  and  order,  and  whose  confidence  you 
have  earned,  and  direct  their  efi*orts  to  uphold  the  laws 
of  your  country  and  defend  lives  and  property  against 
the  attacks  of  lawlessness  and  anarchy,  you  will  not 
regret  the  time  you  have  spent  in  preparing  for  the  in- 
evitable and  will  win  the  gratitude  of  your  fellow-coun- 
trymen, to  whom  that  inevitable  now  seems  impossible. 


RETURN  TO  the  circulation  desk  of  any 
University  of  California  Library 
or  to  the 

NORTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 
BIdg.  400,  Richmond  Field  Station 
University  of  California 
Richmond,  CA  94804-4698 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 
2-month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling 

(415)  642-6753 
1-year  loans  may  be  recharged  by  bringing  books 

to  NRLF 
Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made  4  days 

prior  to  due  date 

DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


^R  28 1991 


SENtOMUI. 


AUG  0  6  1999 


II.  C  BERKELEY 


JAN  2  1  2001 


re  02750 


